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THE LITTLE WORD “DUE”
Andrew T. Hyman*

I. INTRODUCTION
1

The Fifth and Fourteenth2 Amendments bar the government from
depriving anyone of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.” The ambiguity of that phrase has kept the judiciary busy for many
generations, but that same ambiguity has become “completely eclipsed
by the little word ‘due.’”3 The goal of the present article is to study this
critical word, and in particular to examine whether a process is
automatically “due” if it is owed according to positive law,4 or
*Ware, Fressola, Van Der Sluys and Adolphson, LLP in Monroe, CT. Mail@andrewhyman.com.
Thanks to Richard L. Aynes, Jeremiah Collins, James W. Ely, Matthew J. Franck, Alfred Fressola,
Brian Lehman, and James Retter for commenting on drafts. Also, thanks to John Kaminski for his
hospitality at the Ratification Project in Wisconsin, to Ken Bowling at the Documentary History of
the First Federal Congress, and to Margaret Chisolm of Yale Law Library. The views presented
here are not necessarily those of anyone but the author.
1. “No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. The federal and state governments are limited by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
respectively.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
3. RODNEY L. MOTT, DUE PROCESS OF LAW 703 (Leonard W. Levy ed., Da Capo Press
1973) (1926). Mott’s book is a very useful tool for any researcher looking for leads to original
material and early practices regarding due process. The key role of the word “due” in modern
jurisprudence is exemplified by the abortion cases. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 874 (1992) (“Only where state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman’s ability
to make this decision does the power of the State reach into the heart of the liberty protected by the
Due Process Clause.”)
4. Dictionaries tell us that the word “due” has several variations of meaning, depending on
the context. However, the basic meaning of the word “due” is “owed.” See SAMUEL JOHNSON, A
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (11th ed. 1779): “The participle passive of owe. [dû,
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alternatively whether a process can only be “due” if it accords with
judicially ascertained principles of liberty and justice. The present
article concludes that the latter interpretation is incorrect, and that the
Due Process Clause should not be used to convert natural law into
enforceable law outside the democratic and republican procedures
established by the Constitution.
Justice Hugo Black, especially in his later years, advocated the
objectivistic (as opposed to subjectivistic) interpretation: “[f]or me the
only correct meaning of that phrase [‘due process of law’] is that our
Government must proceed according to the ‘law of the land’ — that is,
according to written constitutional and statutory provisions as interpreted
by court decisions.”5 The terms “objectivistic” and “subjectivistic” refer
here to the perspective of the judiciary, which will either look primarily
to external positive law such as statutes and constitutions in order to
determine what is due (as objectivists), or will instead look to the
judiciary’s own contrary experiences, standards, and precedents to
determine what is due (as subjectivists). The essential question that this
article addresses is not whether due process is substantive or procedural,
but instead whether it is subjectivistic or objectivistic.
The present article does not dispute that various other constitutional
provisions do grant the judiciary considerable flexibility to exercise
restraint upon Congress and upon the states. Nor does the present article
dispute that the Due Process Clause allows the judiciary to determine
what is “due” based upon other factors when no pertinent positive law
requirement exists, assuming that Congress intended the judiciary to fill
French.] 1. Owed . . . .” See also infra note 129 (a definition of “due” provided by the Supreme
Court).
5. In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 382 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) quoted in Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2680 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting). See also John Harrison,
Substantive Due Process and the Constitutional Text, 83 VA. L. REV. 493, 542 n.132 (1997) (“‘Due’
in this context much more likely means ‘proper under the applicable law.’”); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE
CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888, at 272 (Univ. of
Chicago Press 1992) (1985); Frank Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 SUP. CT. REV.
85, 95-100; Congressman Thaddeus Stevens, Speech Introducing Fourteenth Amendment (May 8,
1866) in CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2459 (explaining that the Due Process Clause would
protect citizens by preventing states from “unlawfully depriving them of life, liberty, or property”)
quoted in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 104 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). Note that the
adjective “subjectivistic” is used in this article to describe an interpretation of the Due Process
Clause, instead of using the adjective “subjective,” thus hopefully avoiding the negative
connotations of the latter term. The Due Process Clause raises a unique question: “due according to
what?” The term “objectivistic” is generally used here not to signify a positivist answer to that
question (nor a textualist, originalist, or interpretivist answer), but rather is used here to signify a
positivist answer only if positive law speaks to the issue, and otherwise the answer may be drawn
from other sources.
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up those details. However, when a pertinent positive law requirement
exists, then it generally controls what is “due.”
The assertion that courts have subjectivistically construed the Due
Process Clause should not be taken as an accusation that judges have
tried to selfishly insert their own emotions or personal beliefs into the
clause, although that may have happened on occasion. Rather, the
Supreme Court has developed principles for imposing due process
restraints on legislators without having found those principles in any
express or implied requirement of either the Due Process Clause or any
other positive law.
Bear in mind, by the way, that an objectivistic interpretation of due
process need not allow Congress to “make any process ‘due process of
law,’ by its mere will.”6
Throughout this article, it will be assumed that the Supreme Court
has correctly concluded that the word “process” encompasses both
substantive and procedural aspects, as Congress indicated when it passed
the Process Act of 1789.7 Were it not for the technical way that
Congress used and understood the word “process” in 1789, that word
would have to be construed today according to its ordinary procedural
meaning, rather than as having substantive content also. Similarly, the
word “due” should be interpreted as intended by the Framers of the

6. Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 276 (1855), quoted
in O’Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 795 n.5 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring
in the judgment). See generally infra text accompanying note 70 (objectivistic limits on Congress).
7. Federal courts were required to employ local “modes of process” in common lawsuits,
and were required to employ civil law “modes of proceedings” in causes of equity. An Act to
Regulate Processes in the Courts of the United States (Process Act of 1789), 1 Stat. 93 § 2 (1789).
The word “modes” was not useless in either instance, and was specifically inserted by amendment
in the latter instance. House of Representatives Journal, Sept. 24, 1789, reprinted in 1 JOURNAL OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 122 (Gales & Seaton 1825). Congress thus used the word
“process” in a technical way. It was well known in 1789 that “process” was a term of art. See infra
note 40 and accompanying text (Hamilton confirming that “due process” is a technical term). See
generally infra note 25 and accompanying text (further discussing the Process Act). Justice Scalia
has interpreted the word “process” in a less technical way. See United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S.
26, 39-40 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment, joined by Thomas, J.). See generally infra
note 55 and accompanying text (Bouvier shared Scalia’s view). Justice Scalia acknowledges that
American colonists “almost certainly” equated the phrases “due process of the law” and “law of the
land,” see Pacific Mutual v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 29 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment),
but the latter phrase facially connotes nothing about judicial procedure or about procedural versus
substantive law. The Framers of the Bill of Rights apparently did not believe that the concept of
“substantive process” was an oxymoron. See generally James W. Ely Jr., The Oxymoron
Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in the Origins of Substantive Due Process, 16 CONST.
COMMENTARY 315 (1999). There is a difference between “procedures” in a cause of action, and
“proceedings” in a cause of action; the word “process” referred in 1789 to the latter. See infra note
40.
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Constitution and as mandated by the structure of the Constitution,
instead of according to a subjectivistic standard a la recent due process
cases like Lawrence v. Texas.8 The intended constitutional meaning of
the word “due” ought to be respected — given our country’s devotion to
the rule of law rather than the rule of judges — even if the results of
cases like Lawrence may be laudable from a policy point of view, or
laudable from a fundamental human rights point of view. In the context
of the Fifth Amendment, the word “due” simply means “owed”
according to the “law of the land,” and the Fourteenth Amendment was
meant to adopt that same meaning. Of course, statutes are part of the
“law of the land,” assuming they do not conflict with any other
constitutional provisions.
The objectivistic meaning of the Due Process Clause is apparent in
a number of different ways, one of which is to consider the structure of
the Bill of Rights. The Due Process Clause is presently construed by the
courts in a way that incorporates rights that are listed elsewhere in the
Bill of Rights, and in a way that furthermore incorporates other rights
that are listed nowhere in the Bill of Rights. This construction of the
clause creates a well-known problem of superfluousness, in the sense
that an explicit enumeration of a right like free speech becomes
unnecessary to ensure judicial protection of that free speech right.
However, the courts’ present construction of the Due Process Clause
also creates a subtle but more compelling textual problem than
superfluousness. The specific rights in the Bill of Rights are broken up
into distinct amendments that were ratified simultaneously and apart
from each other, instead of in one single amendment, and this apartness
has ramifications. Suppose, for example, that the First Amendment had
been rejected after having been proposed to the states, but the rest of the
Bill of Rights had been entirely ratified by the states. The fact that
Congress allowed the states to do such a thing implies that Congress did
not view the Fifth Amendment as necessarily encompassing the First, for
otherwise Congress would have been allowing the states to deliver
simultaneous contradictory messages about whether free speech would
be protected. As we shall see, the historical record confirms that the

8. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). Five justices voted to overturn “sodomy” laws
in thirteen states on due process grounds. Id. at 563, 573. Three other justices voted against
overturning any of those laws. Additionally, Justice O’Connor voted to strike down only sodomy
laws of the four states that treated homosexual and heterosexual sodomy differently, arguing that the
Equal Protection Clause “requires a sodomy law to apply equally.” Id. at 584 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment). This aspect of the Equal Protection Clause is outside the scope of the
present article.
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separateness of each of the first ten amendments was a very deliberate
congressional decision, which led the states to believe that those
amendments dealt with distinct classes of rights.
The Due Process Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment mimics the
same clause in the Fifth Amendment, and therefore the meaning of that
clause in the Fifth controls the meaning in the Fourteenth. Given that
the clause in the Fifth Amendment excludes the content of the other Bill
of Rights amendments, the same clause in the Fourteenth Amendment
cannot truly apply the protections of the rest of the Bill of Rights, such
as free speech, against the states. However, another part of the
Fourteenth Amendment does apply those protections.
Let us look once more at the text of the Constitution, to see a
second way of independently deducing the objectivistic meaning of the
word “due.” This word was used before the Bill of Rights was added, in
the infamous “Fugitive Slave Clause,” which was adopted unanimously
at the constitutional convention in Philadelphia even though many of the
Framers opposed slavery.9 No one seriously disputes the objectivistic
meaning of the word “due” in that clause, because any other
interpretation of the word “due” in the original Constitution would have
been a license to disregard the oppressive and unjust demands of the
southern states. Clearly, the Framers of the Bill of Rights were familiar
with an objectivistic use of the word “due” in the Constitution. This is
9. “No person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into
another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or
labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due.”
U.S. CONST. art IV, § 2, cl. 3 (emphasis added). See infra note 54 (noting that the Framers carefully
eliminated any language in this clause that might have implied slavery was moral). This clause is
important historically, and also important as an aid to understanding how the Framers used terms in
the rest of the document. A repealed clause may “no longer be found in the Constitution; but it aids
in the construction of those clauses with which it was originally associated.” Fletcher v. Peck, 10
U.S. 87, 139 (1810). The Fletcher case is also mentioned in note 118 infra. See generally United
States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 943 (1988) (“not all situations in which labor is compelled by
physical coercion or force of law violate the Thirteenth Amendment”); CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong.,
1st Sess., 1325 (1864) (documenting Thaddeus Stevens’ proposal to the House that the Thirteenth
Amendment explicitly repeal the Fugitive Slave Clause. His proposal was withdrawn after a
preliminary vote of 69 to 38, which was short of the required two-thirds). Of course, the same word
“due” can have two different meanings in the Constitution:
Undoubtedly, there is a natural presumption that identical words used in different parts
of the same act are intended to have the same meaning. But the presumption is not rigid
and readily yields whenever there is such variation in the connection in which the words
are used as reasonably to warrant the conclusion that they were employed in different
parts of the act with different intent.
Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932). At the very least, use of the
word “due” in the Fugitive Slave Clause proves that the Framers knew how to use this word
objectivistically. See generally infra note 46 (noting that many states opposed slavery in the 1780s).
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true even if the Fugitive Slave Clause may have been correctly viewed
by some people as merely an agreement between the states (i.e. an
agreement that Congress had no power to enforce); such an agreement
would have been not just unenforceable but also meaningless, if a
northern state were entitled to say that no slave labor was “due” to any
slave owner. In other words, regardless of whether Congress was meant
to have power to enforce the Fugitive Slave Clause, that Clause still was
a directive to the states as to their constitutional obligations, and those
obligations would have been illusory using a subjectivistic interpretation
of the word “due.” This consideration alone does not prove that the
Framers used the same word the same way in the Due Process Clause,
nor does it create any rigid presumption they did, but it does clearly
show that the Framers were able and willing to use the word “due” in its
objectivistic sense.
A third way of independently deducing the objectivistic meaning of
the word “due” in the Fifth Amendment is to ignore the word “due” in
the Fugitive Slave Clause. Suppose that the Fugitive Slave Clause did
not even use the word “due.” Still, an African-American slave was a
“person” covered by the Due Process Clause, while at the same time
being a “person” subject to delivery back into bondage according to the
Fugitive Slave Clause. Therefore, the Due Process Clause could not
possibly have been intended as a prohibition against federal laws (such
as the Fugitive Slave Clause) that were widely recognized in 1788 to be
contrary to all principles of liberty and justice. The Due Process Clause
and the Fugitive Slave Clause coexisted in the Constitution, and indeed
when the New York ratification convention first proposed the “due
process” language for inclusion in the Bill of Rights, that convention
confirmed that the Due Process Clause would be “consistent with” the
original Constitution, including the “wicked” and “unjust” Fugitive
Slave Clause.10 The New York political leaders who gave us the federal
10. See Ratification of the Constitution by the State of New York (July 26, 1788) reprinted in
2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 192, 195 (Johnson Reprint Corp. 1894). New
York ratified the Constitution, including the Fugitive Slave Clause, while declaring that, “no Person
ought to be taken imprisoned, or disseised of his freehold, or be exiled or deprived of his Privileges,
Franchises, Life, Liberty or Property but by due process of Law,” and furthermore declaring that
“the explanations aforesaid are consistent with the said Constitution.” Id. See generally infra note
50 (Robert Cover describing the relationship between due process and slavery). A leading delegate
in the New York ratification convention, Melancton Smith, described the Constitution this way:
The very operation of it was to give certain privileges to those people who were so
wicked as to keep slaves. He knew it would be admitted that this . . . was founded on
unjust principles, but that it was the result of accommodation; which, he supposed, we
should be under the necessity of admitting, if we meant to be in union with the Southern
States, though utterly repugnant to his feelings.
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Due Process Clause emphatically were not blind to the injustice of
slavery, and at the same time they recognized that the requirement of
“due” process does not protect an enslaved person’s fundamental
liberties against federally sponsored deprivation.11
It is to be
emphasized that this line of reasoning has nothing to do with the fact
that the word “due” is used in the Fugitive Slave Clause. Moreover, this
line of reasoning has nothing to do with whether or not the Fugitive
Slave Clause was enforceable by Congress; this Clause was a federal
law, and it conferred at least some rights that were enforceable by the
federal courts even without action by Congress. These textual reasons
for rejecting a subjectivistic “due process” are discussed further in Part
II of the present article, along with others that are perhaps even more
compelling.
One of the Supreme Court’s motivations for its subjectivistic
approach to the Due Process Clause has been a perceived need to ensure
that this clause, unlike the Third Amendment in wartime,12 will serve as
a restraint on Congress. Whatever may be the merits of that perception,
the Due Process Clause does in fact restrain Congress even if the word
“due” is construed in an objectivistic manner, as discussed in Part III.
The objectivistic interpretation of the word “due” preserves the core
meaning of the Due Process Clause, which is unrelated to restraining
Congress. John Jay (later the first Chief Justice of the U.S.) explained as
2 JONATHAN ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 227 (1836) (emphasis added) (discussing apportionment of
representatives). Alexander Hamilton said that slaves “are persons known to the municipal laws of
the states which they inhabit, as well as to the laws of nature.” Id. at 237 (emphasis added). See
generally infra note 44 (municipal laws of the southern states). The Constitution thus intended that
the Due Process Clause cover slaves. See infra note 45. According to English law predating the
Revolution, the ability of a slave-owner to recover fugitive slaves found in England was not
supportable by custom, usage, or unwritten law: “nothing can be suffered to support it but positive
law.” Somerset v. Stewart, 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B. 1772). Of course, this became the rule in
America as well. See Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 611 (1842); cf. The Antelope, 23 U.S. 66,
123 (1825) (custom and usage supported legality of the slave trade of other nations “on the high
seas in time of peace”). See also 4 JONATHAN ELLIOTT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL CONVENTIONS
ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 176 (1836) (“If any of our slaves, said he
[Iredell], go there, and remain there a certain time, they would, by the present laws, be entitled to
their freedom, so that their masters could not get them again.”); 3 id. at 452-54 (“At present, if any
slave elopes to any of those states where slaves are free, he becomes emancipated by their laws”)
(Madison speaking at the Virginia ratification convention). See generally infra note 46 for some
history about the abolition of slavery.
11. See generally Ratification of the Constitution by the State of New York (July 26, 1788)
reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 192 (Johnson Reprint Corp. 1894).
12. The Third Amendment states: “No soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any
house, without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by
law.” U.S. CONST. amend. III. See also infra note 70 and accompanying text.
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follows in the midst of the American Revolution:
It is the undoubted Right and unalienable Privilege of a Freeman not to
be divested, or interrupted in the innocent use, of Life, Liberty or
Property, but by Laws to which he has assented, either personally or by
his Representatives. This is the Corner Stone of every free
Constitution, and to defend it from the Iron Hand of the Tyrant of
Britain, all America is now in arms . . . .13

The core meaning of the Due Process Clause is thus that laws
protecting life, liberty, and property must be respected by all branches
and officials of the government. However, the Supreme Court has read a
great deal more into the Due Process Clause, and in so doing has greatly
undermined that core meaning. The Court now regularly uses the Due
Process Clause to override laws enacted by elected representatives,
thereby eliminating various liberties of some people if those liberties
conflict with unenumerated “fundamental” rights of other people. The
Court accomplishes this deprivation without relying upon any applicable
law, except the Due Process Clause itself. This subjectivistic doctrine of
due process has turned John Jay’s “cornerstone” into wax, as discussed
further in Part IV.
The revered English jurist William Blackstone explained why only
the legislature — and not unaccountable judges or monarchs — should
have power to abolish statutes that are generally unfair:
It were endless to enumerate all the affirmative acts of parliament
wherein justice is directed to be done according to the law of the land:
and what that law is, every subject knows; or may know, if he pleases:
for it depends not upon the arbitrary will of any judge; but is
permanent, fixed, and unchangeable, unless by authority of
parliament. . . . Not only the substantial part, or judicial decisions, of
the law, but also the formal part, or method of proceeding, cannot be
altered but by parliament. . . .14

13. John Jay, A Hint to the Legislature of the State of New York (1778), reprinted in 5 THE
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 312 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., Univ. of Chicago Press
1987). This principle of Magna Carta is primarily a limitation on executive and judicial power. Cf.
infra note 70 (the Court stating that the prohibition would be to no avail if it did not limit legislative
power). The principles spelled out here by John Jay have not been met with enthusiasm by some
judges and scholars, who have insisted that the Due Process Clause would be “absolutely nugatory”
and “mere nonsense” if it did not restrict the legislature. THOMAS COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF
THE AMERICAN UNION 433 (5th ed. 1883) (citations omitted). Note that John Jay was a leading
member of the New York ratification convention that proposed the Due Process Clause for
inclusion in the Bill of Rights.
14. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 OF THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
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A similar principle applies under the U.S. Constitution, but this principle
has been eroded by overextension of the Due Process Clause.
Many rights that the Court now classifies as due process rights
actually are in a different class from due process, as evidenced by the
fact (mentioned above) that the Bill of Rights amendments were
submitted for separate ratifications in each state; this textual point is
confirmed by the remarks of the Framers, including newly published
correspondence of Roger Sherman. Many of those non-due-process
rights can be protected against state infringement by other provisions of
the Constitution, especially by the Privileges or Immunities Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Unfortunately, the Court has begun to
overextend the Privileges or Immunities Clause also, as discussed in Part
V.
Throughout the rest of this article, it is assumed that the Due
Process Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment has the same basic
meaning as in the Fifth Amendment. In other words, the primary goal of
the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment was to duplicate the inherent
meaning of the Fifth Amendment’s clause, and to generally follow
judicial interpretation of the Fifth Amendment.15 This assumption
ENGLAND 137-138 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1979) (facsimile of the first edition of 1765-1769). See
generally infra note 42 (further quoting Blackstone).
15. See, e.g., Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 415 (1945) (“To suppose that ‘due process
of law’ meant one thing in the Fifth Amendment and another in the Fourteenth is too frivolous to
require elaborate rejection” (Frankfurter, J., concurring in part)); Carroll v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 199
U.S. 401, 410 (1905) (same); French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 181 U.S. 324, 329 (1901)
(assuming “that the legal import of the phrase ‘due process of law’ is the same in both
Amendments” although different constructions may be proper); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S.
516, 535, 541 (1884) (“when the same phrase was employed . . . it was used in the same sense and
with no greater extent”). The primary author of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
was John Bingham, and he (like other supporters of the Fourteenth Amendment) said that he only
wanted to enforce pre-existing federal rights against the states. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1088-1089 (1866). Bingham disclaimed any intention to change the meaning of due process,
saying that “the courts have settled that long ago.” Id. It was very well-settled in 1866 that “due
process” conveyed the same meaning as the phrase “law of the land.” See infra note 38 and
accompanying text. However, the meaning of the “law of the land” remained unsettled in the
courts, as discussed in Section III of the present article, despite the seemingly clear guidance of the
Constitution’s Supremacy Clause. There is little doubt that the Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment intended for past and future judicial interpretation of the pre-existing Constitution to be
followed. See Senator Jacob Howard, Speech Introducing the Fourteenth Amendment in the Senate
(May 23, 1866) in CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2765 (1866) (“we may gather some
intimation of what probably will be the opinion of the judiciary by referring to . . . Corfield v.
Coryell” regarding Article IV privileges and immunities) quoted in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S.
46, 105 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). Incidentally, there were many purely procedural
characterizations of Fifth Amendment due process during the 1850s from non-court sources. See,
e.g., infra note 55 (John Bouvier). Also during that decade, there were substantive subjectivistic
characterizations of the clause from non-court sources; for example, the Republican Party Platform
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follows not only from the constitutional text, but also from various other
considerations, such as the following: (1) no supporter of the Fourteenth
Amendment said that the Clause should be interpreted differently from
how the same Clause in the Fifth Amendment should be interpreted, and
(2) no supporter of the Fourteenth Amendment indicated any intention to
amend or alter the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. That being so, the
clear, ordained, and established intentions of those who wrote and
ratified the Due Process Clause in the Fifth Amendment must control the
meaning of the same clause in the Fourteenth Amendment, and the only
dispositive legislative history is that of the Fifth Amendment. By the
time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, the understanding of “due
process” had become fragmented, with some leaders taking an
objectivistic view, some a purely procedural subjectivistic view, and
some taking a substantive subjectivistic view. Even if the Framers and
ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment had misinterpreted the Fifth
Amendment in a uniform way without any fragmentation, still their
primary overriding belief about “due process” was that it meant just
what the same clause in the Fifth Amendment meant, and there was no
inclination in 1866 to alter the meaning of the venerated Bill of Rights.
Unfortunately, in the decades after the Fourteenth Amendment was
ratified, the meaning of the Due Process Clause was fundamentally
misconstrued by the courts, thereby weakening the restraints that this
vital Clause is supposed to place on the judiciary itself, as discussed in
Part VI.
II. THE MEANING OF “DUE” IS GOVERNED BY THE LAW OF THE LAND
It is well-known that the federal Due Process Clause has its origins
in the “law of the land” clause of Magna Carta.16 The Due Process
of 1860 mentioned the Due Process Clause as a reason why slavery could not be legalized on
federal territory. See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 297 n.11 (1901) (White, J., concurring). It
is unclear how much the Republican Party Platform relied upon the Due Process Clause, and how
much upon the abolitionist article of the Northwest Ordinance. See Northwest Ordinance of 1787,
Art. VI, 1 stat. 50, 52 (1789) (note that the Ordinance professed to “forever remain unalterable”).
See generally infra note 50 (Robert Cover on the relationship of due process to slavery); infra note
88 (discussing whether the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment misconstrued the Second
Amendment). It would be especially odd for all of the incorporated rights to apply identically in
state and federal proceedings, except for the one right that is identically phrased. See William J.
Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the States, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 545 (1986) (“[O]nce a provision
of the Federal Bill was deemed incorporated, it applied identically in state and federal proceedings.
To this day that remains the position of the Court”). See also Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784,
795 (1969) (“the same constitutional standards apply against both the State and Federal
Governments”).
16. “No Freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised of his Freehold, or Liberties,
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Clause refers to a process of law that is owed to a person according to
“the law of the land,” rather than according to some different set of
principles or beliefs. This objectivistic interpretation of the Due Process
Clause follows not just from an originalist analysis of how the Framers
felt, what they expected, and where they got their ideas; it also follows
from the meanings that they attached to the words they used in the Due
Process Clause, as well as the place of the Due Process Clause in the
overall structure of the Bill of Rights and Constitution. The meaning of
the phrase “law of the land” has itself occasioned controversy, and it is
asserted here that this phrase in the present context refers to positive law,
as well as compatible common law. Judges can formulate common law
rules, subject to modification by elected representatives.
When the New York ratification convention first proposed the “due
process” language for inclusion in the federal Constitution in 1788, that
state’s constitution already contained a clause along the lines of Magna
Carta: “no member of this State shall be disfranchised, or deprived of
any the rights or privileges secured to the subjects of this State by this
constitution, unless by the law of the land, or the judgment of his
peers.”17 Additionally, New York had enacted a statutory bill of rights in
1787, in order to supplement the “law of the land” clause in the state’s
constitution. New York’s statutory bill of rights declared, among other
things, that “no person shall be put to answer without presentment before
justices, or matter of record, or due process of law according to the law
of the land.”18 If there was a conflict between a process that a judge
or free Customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any otherwise destroyed; nor will we not pass upon
him, nor condemn him, but by lawful Judgment of his Peers, or by the Law of the Land.” Magna
Carta, Chapter 39 (1215) (emphasis added) quoted in Pacific Mutual v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 28
(1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Magna Carta was written in Latin, and “vel” has
sometimes been translated as “or” (e.g. in Haslip), and sometimes as “and.” See, e.g., Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 169 (1968) (Black, J., concurring). New York’s constitutional convention
of 1777 addressed this issue: Gilbert Livingston successfully proposed a clause along the lines of
Magna Carta, which was then amended to change “and the judgment of his peers” to read “or the
judgment of his peers.” See CHARLES Z. LINCOLN, 1 CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF NEW YORK 522
(1906). Livingston is also mentioned infra note 113.
17. N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XIII. New York’s constitution also made the common law
“subject, nevertheless, to such alterations and provisions as the legislature of this State may, from
time to time, make concerning the same.” N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXXV. See also N.Y. CONST.
of 1777, art. XLI (“any new court or courts . . . shall proceed according to the course of the common
law”). See generally supra note 16 (controversy about “and” versus “or” in Magna Carta).
18. 2 Laws of N.Y. 344, 345, 10th Sess., ch. 1, §4 (1787) (repealed 1828) reprinted in
CHARLES Z. LINCOLN, 1 CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF NEW YORK 728-732 (1906) (emphasis
added). New York’s statutory bill of rights included four due process clauses, providing as follows:
II. That no citizen of this State shall be taken or imprisoned or be disseised of his or her
freehold or liberties of free customs or outlawed or exiled or condemned or otherwise
destroyed, but by lawful judgment of his or her peers or by due process of law. III. That

HYMAN.DOC

12

12/17/2004 10:06 AM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[38:1

subjectivistically felt was due, and a process that the law of the land said
was due, then a New York judge was obliged to obey the law of the
land, and there is no indication that any other standard was used to
determine what process was “due” in New York during the 1780s.
When New Yorkers ratified the U.S. Constitution, their ratification
convention declared that the proposed Due Process Clause would be
“consistent with the said [federal] constitution,” including the
Supremacy Clause.19 Of course, the Supremacy Clause made federal
positive law the supreme “law of the land”20 — supreme even over state
law codifying natural justice. The New York convention thus meant for
judges to construe “due process” consistently with what positive law
said was due.
Like New York, Virginia knew that the “law of the land” would be
subject to the Supremacy Clause. Virginia had ratified the Constitution
while requesting that it be amended so that “no freeman ought to be
taken, imprisoned, or disseised of his freehold, liberties, privileges or
franchises, or outlawed or exiled, or in any manner destroyed or
deprived of his life, liberty or property but by the law of the land.”21 The
no citizen of this State shall be taken or imprisoned for any offence upon petition or
suggestion unless it be by indictment or presentment of good and lawful men of the same
neighborhood where such deeds be done, in due manner or by due process of law. IV.
That no person shall be put to answer without presentment before justices, or matter of
record, or due process of law according to the law of the land and if any thing be done to
the contrary it shall be void in law and holden for error. V. That no person, of what
estate or condition soever shall be taken or imprisoned, or disinherited or put to death
without being brought to answer by due process of law, and that no person shall be put
out of his or her franchise or freehold or lose his or her life or limb, or goods and
chattels, unless he or she be duly brought to answer and be forejudged of the same by
due course of law and if any thing be done contrary to the same it shall be void in law
and holden for none.
Id. Notice that a “person” meant a person of any condition, and was distinguished from a “citizen”
(the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution makes this same distinction). The lead author
of this New York bill of rights was Samuel Jones. Jones’ name is now used (believe it or not) as
slang for an “addiction.” Ed Boland, FYI, N.Y. Times, March 17, 2002 at 2 (in “The City” section).
19. See supra note 10 (quoting New York ratification resolution).
20. The Supremacy Clause says: “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.” U.S. CONST. Art. VI, cl. 2. See generally Letters from the Federal
Farmer to the Republican, IV (October 12, 1787) reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST
246 (Herbert J. Storing, ed., Univ. of Chicago Press 1981) (“the laws of the United States . . . will be
also supreme laws, and wherever they shall be incompatible with those customs, rights, laws or
constitutions heretofore established, they will also entirely abolish them and do them away”).
21. 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 268, 379 (Johnson Reprint Corp.
1894). Compare this with the language proposed by the New York ratification convention, quoted
supra note 10. Here is a brief chronology of some important events related to the Due Process
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phrase “due process of law” proposed by New York is entirely
consistent with the phrase “law of the land” that had earlier been
proposed by Virginia, and there is no evidence that New York changed
Virginia’s phraseology for any momentous reason.22
In 1789, “due” process meant process due according to the law of
the land, and the Supreme Court has agreed to that proposition on the
authority of Sir Edward Coke, whose writings were very familiar to the
ratifying states, and who asserted that a process agreeable to the law of
the land would be “due” process.23 The Due Process Clause of the U.S.
Constitution stands in contrast to a document like the Massachusetts
Body of Liberties, enacted in 1641, which began with the following
preamble:
The free fruition of such liberties Immunities and priveledges as
humanitie, Civilitie, and Christianitie call for as due to every man in
his place and proportion without impeachment and Infringement hath
ever bene and ever will be the tranquillitie and Stabilitie of Churches
and Commonwealths.24

That Massachusetts document spoke of liberties that were due to

Clause: Virginia’s ratification convention proposed a “law of the land” clause on June 27, 1788;
New York’s ratification convention proposed “due process” language on July 26, 1788; North
Carolina’s ratification convention endorsed Virginia’s language on August 2, 1788; Madison
proposed “due process” language on June 8, 1789. Congress proposed the Due Process Clause to
the states on September 25, 1789. See infra note 130 (quoting the preamble that Congress sent
along with the proposed amendments). The Due Process Clause was ultimately ratified on
December 15, 1791.
22. On the contrary, New York merely wanted to avoid tampering with language of Magna
Carta: “To have taken the clause, ‘law of the land,’ without its immediate context [in Magna Carta],
might possibly have given rise to doubts . . .” Murray, 59 U.S. at 276. Truncating Magna Carta’s
language, as proposed by Virginia (i.e. omitting the “judgment of his peers”), would have especially
bothered those New Yorkers who believed that the omitted language was meant to further protect
individual rights. See generally supra note 16 (debate about “and” versus “or”).
23. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (Justice Black arguing that “due process” is
equivalent to “law of the land”); supra note 7 (Justice Scalia saying same thing).
There are certain general principles well settled . . . which narrow the field of discussion
and may serve as helps to correct conclusions. These principles grow out of the
proposition universally accepted by American courts on the authority of Coke, that the
words “due process of law” are equivalent in meaning to the words “law of the land,”
contained in that chapter of Magna Carta.
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 100 (1908); Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 93 (1875) (“Due
process of law is process due according to the law of the land.”). See also infra note 38 and
accompanying text (the Court saying the same thing in Murray). See generally infra note 59 (Coke
defining “law of the land”).
24. The Body of Liberties of the Massachusetts Collonie in New England (1641) reprinted in
5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 46 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., Univ. of Chicago
Press 1987) (emphasis added).
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every man according to humanity, civility, and Christianity. In contrast,
the federal Due Process Clause secures protections that are due to every
person according to the law of the land, and the Constitution recognizes
no law higher than the supreme law of the land; were it otherwise, there
would be no legislative control over the most vital aspects of the justice
system, except at the pleasure of the Supreme Court.
John Marshall (the fourth Chief Justice of the U.S.) emphasized the
importance of legislative control over judicial process:
The line has not been exactly drawn which separates those important
subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself,
from those of less interest, in which a general provision may be made,
and power given to those who are to act under such general provisions
to fill up the details. To determine the character of the power given to
the Courts by the Process Act, we must inquire into its extent..25

Thus, the courts in Marshall’s day filled up the details regarding
process, while legislatures dealt with the more important policy aspects.
The Supreme Court’s present subjectivistic doctrine of substantive due
process has reversed that constitutional arrangement.
For centuries in England, processes that were required by positive
law were inherently considered “due,” unless negated by a superior (e.g.
later) statute.26 There is no evidence that any English statute
guaranteeing “due process” was ever deemed to override a pre-existing
statute. The Fifth Amendment adopted England’s objectivistic use of
the word “due.”
Alexander Hamilton explained that New York’s constitution,
including its “law of the land” clause, did not confer enforceable
25. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 43 (1825) (emphasis added). See supra note 7 (regarding
the Process Act). Chief Justice Marshall explained that Congress in 1789 did not view the word
“process” as being limited merely to writs emanating from a court: “The term is applicable to writs
and executions, but it is also applicable to every step taken in a cause.” Wayman, 23 U.S. at 27.
The Process Act was again discussed by the Court later the same year. See Bank of the United
States v. Halstead, 23 U.S. 51 (1825).
26. James Madison explained as follows:
Although I know whenever the great rights, the trial by jury, freedom of the press, or
liberty of conscience, come in question in that body [Parliament], the invasion of them is
resisted by able advocates, yet their Magna Charta does not contain any one provision
for the security of those rights, respecting which the people of America are most
alarmed.
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 453 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) (speech of James Madison introducing Bill of
Rights). It is virtually undisputed that the numerous guarantees of “due process” enacted
throughout English history imposed no restraint on Parliament, and furthermore repealed no prior
provisions of law. See generally infra note 59 (the King’s Bench explaining the meaning of “due
process”).
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protection for various other rights secured by the U.S. Constitution:
“[t]he establishment of the writ of habeas corpus, the prohibition of ex
post facto laws, and of titles of nobility, to which we have no
corresponding provisions in our [state] constitution, are perhaps greater
securities to liberty and republicanism than any it contains.”27 Habeas
corpus is a procedural rather than a substantive right, and yet Hamilton
said that even that procedural right was not secured by the “law of the
land” clause in New York’s constitution.28 Likewise, during the
Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, Hugh Williamson of North
Carolina explained that the ex post facto clause in his state’s constitution
was helpful so that “the Judges can take hold of it.”29 Williamson thus
believed that the “law of the land” clause of his state constitution was
insufficient for judicially striking down ex post facto laws.30 Historical
27. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 441 (Alexander Hamilton) (William Brock ed., 1992).
28. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (recitation of New York’s “law of the land”
clause).
29. “Such a prohibitory clause is in the Constitution of N. Carolina, and tho it has been
violated, it has done good there & may do good here, because the Judges can take hold of it.” 2
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 376 (Max Farrand ed., Yale Univ. Press 1927)
(1911) (emphasis added). Here are excerpts from North Carolina’s constitution of 1776:
XII. That no freeman ought to be taken, imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold liberties
or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed, or deprived of his life,
liberty, or property, but by the law of the land. . . . XIV. That in all controversies at law,
respecting property, the ancient mode of trial, by jury, is one of the best securities of the
rights of the people, and ought to remain sacred and inviolable. . . . XXIV. That
retrospective laws, punishing facts committed before the existence of such laws, and by
them only declared criminal, are oppressive, unjust, and incompatible with liberty;
wherefore no ex post facto law ought to be made.
N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XII, XIV & XXIV. Article XIV was the subject of one of the nation’s
first cases of judicial review. See Bayard v. Singleton, 1 N.C. 5, 7 (1787).
30. Madison said that ex post facto laws were voided by the “spirit and scope” of state
constitutions. See THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 229 (James Madison) (William Brock ed., 1992).
But, he suggested that such vague prohibitions would not be judicially enforceable. See 1 ANNALS
OF CONG. 457 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) (courts will “resist every encroachment upon rights
expressly stipulated for in the Constitution”). Hamilton likewise explained that specified exceptions
to legislative authority, such as ex post facto laws, are essential to a limited Constitution. See THE
FEDERALIST No. 78, at 399 (Alexander Hamilton) (William Brock ed., 1992). See also Hurtado v.
California, 110 U.S. 516, 531 (1884) (“bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, laws declaring
forfeitures of estates, and other arbitrary acts of legislation which occur so frequently in English
history, were never regarded as inconsistent with the law of the land”); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386,
398 (1798) (“some speculative jurists have held, that a legislative act against natural justice must, in
itself, be void; but I cannot think that . . . any Court of Justice would possess a power to declare it
so”) (Iredell, J., concurring). In Calder, Justice Chase criticized legislative acts that violate natural
justice: “An ACT of the Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the great first principles
of the social compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority.” Id. at 388
(Chase, J., concurring). Chase failed to recognize that the Constitution itself calls ex post facto acts
“laws.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; § 10, cl. 1. Justices Chase, Iredell, and Patterson agreed that
Connecticut had acted within its power, but Patterson was even more revolted by the legislation
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evidence like this confirms the objectivistic meaning of the Due Process
Clause, even if that meaning was not already apparent from the text of
the U.S. Constitution.
The Presentment Clause of the U.S. Constitution31 describes what
“shall be a law,” and the Supremacy Clause says that such laws shall be
the supreme “law of the land” if made pursuant to the Constitution.32
These provisions of the Constitution amount to a functional definition of
“law,” and should preempt any attempt by courts to assert that particular
legislation is somehow not good enough to be a “law.” Neither the
Presentment Clause nor the Supremacy Clause contains any significant
limitation upon the kinds of laws that Congress can make, provided that
those laws conform to the rest of the Constitution. Congress has always
been able to pass laws unrelated to the general community, including
“private bills” benefiting specific individuals. Likewise, by ratifying the
Fugitive Slave Clause of the Constitution, even the most anti-slavery
states acknowledged that the oppressive slavery statutes of the southern
states were “laws,” and that the requirement to return fugitive slaves was
the “law of the land.”33 James Wilson reconfirmed the straightforward
objectivistic meaning of the phrase “law of the land” when he lamented
that, “the most formidable Enemy to private Liberty, is, at this moment,
the Law of the Land.”34
There is further historical evidence reconfirming the objectivistic
interpretation of the word “due” in the federal Due Process Clause. For
example, in 1788, the Antifederalist faction opposed ratification of the
Constitution and demanded assurances of a strong bill of rights. The
than Chase, believing that it violated “the fundamental principles of the social compact.” Calder, 3
U.S. at 397
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
32. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Cf. infra note 40 and accompanying text (Hamilton asserting
that the law of the land would not include an act of legislature).
33. See supra note 9 (Fugitive Slave Clause).
34. See Mark Hall, James Wilson’s Law Lectures, 128 PA. MAG. HIST. AND BIOGRAPHY 63,
71 (2004). During his lectures in 1791, Wilson also taught that citizens “are bound to transgress” a
manmade law that is prohibited by natural law, and added that judges should also transgress those
manmade laws. 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 326-331 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., Belknap
Press of Harvard Univ. Press 1967). This latter opinion of Wilson was in tension with his own
words in 1787 during the Constitutional Convention: “Laws may be unjust, may be unwise, may be
dangerous, may be destructive; and yet not be so unconstitutional as to justify the Judges in refusing
to give them effect.” 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 73 (Max Farrand ed.,
Yale Univ. Press 1927) (1911). George Mason concurred that judges “could declare an
unconstitutional law void. But with regard to every law, however unjust, oppressive or pernicious,
which did not come plainly under this description, they would be under the necessity as Judges to
give it a free course.” Id. at 78. In any event, Wilson never confused the “law of the land” with
“natural law.”
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Antifederalists argued that the common law rights that were recognized
in the various states should be secured by a federal bill of rights “in
general words, as in New-York [and] the Western Territory,” or
“[p]erhaps it would be better to enumerate the particular essential
rights.”35 Regarding the Antifederalists’ “general” proposal, New
York’s constitution allowed legislative modification of the common law,
as did the Northwest Ordinance,36 and so common law did not control
legislatures in New York or in the Western Territory, but rather provided
default rights absent further legislative action. The Antifederalists thus
seem to have been suggesting that the federal Constitution should
generally guarantee common law rights subject to modification by
Congress, rather than in a way that would control Congress. In any
event, the Antifederalists admitted that the “law of the land” clause
(which New York’s constitution borrowed from Magna Carta) secured a
“particular” right rather than a “general” right, and so there is scant
reason to believe that they intended for the Due Process Clause to
embrace any “general” right, much less a general right that would
control Congress. The Antifederalists simply understood the “law of the
land” clause to require that a person’s life, liberty, and estate would be
preserved by a known law applied by a known judge, instead of being
preserved by natural law.37 The New Yorkers who demanded the federal
35. Letters from the Federal Farmer to the Republican, XVI (January 20, 1788) reprinted in 2
THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 327 (Herbert J. Storing, ed., Univ. of Chicago Press 1981)
(emphasis added). The Federal Farmer was not contemplating adherence to ancient common law,
but rather was referring to the common law that was “used and established in the said states.” Id.
Unlike the Fifth Amendment, the Seventh does explicitly “preserve” parts of ancient common law.
U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The Federal Farmer was a pseudonym for Melancton Smith. See infra
note 130.
36. See THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 441 (Alexander Hamilton) (William Brock ed., 1992)
(May 28, 1788) (“to the pretended establishment of the common and state law by the [New York]
constitution, I answer, that they are expressly made subject ‘to such alterations and provisions as the
legislature shall from time to time make concerning the same’”). See also supra note 17 and
accompanying text (quoting New York constitution). Nathan Dane wrote the Northwest Ordinance
which guaranteed “judicial proceedings according to the course of the common law.” See
Northwest Ordinance of 1787, Art. II, 1 stat. 52 (1789) (the Ordinance also included a “law of the
land” clause). However, Dane did not believe that common law would restrain legislatures. See
generally Nathan Dane, 6 GENERAL ABRIDGMENT AND DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAW §182 art. 5, 230
(Cummings, Hilliard & Co. 1823) (when “a statute makes an offence, and is silent as to the mode of
trial, it shall be by jury, according to the course of the common law”).
37. See Letters from the Federal Farmer to the Republican, XVI (January 20, 1788) reprinted
in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 327-328 (Herbert J. Storing, ed., Univ. of Chicago Press
1981). The Federal Farmer described the “law of the land” clause by referring to the following
statement of the great political theorist John Locke:
The great and chief end . . . of men uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves
under government, is the preservation of their [lives, liberties, and estates]. To which in
the state of Nature there are many things wanting. First, there wants an established,
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Due Process Clause never dreamed that it would make natural law
binding upon them.
The Supreme Court has long recognized the connection between
due process and Magna Carta: “The words, ‘due process of law,’ were
undoubtedly intended to convey the same meaning as the words, ‘by the
law of the land,’ in Magna Charta. Lord Coke, in his commentary on
those words, says they mean due process of law.”38 Some scholars
believe that Lord Coke may have been incorrect when he said that “by
the law of the land” means the same thing as “by due process of law,”39
and likewise there was some disagreement in February of 1787 as to the
meaning of the phrase “law of the land,” judging from a speech of
Alexander Hamilton in the New York Assembly:
[The state constitution says] no man shall be disfranchised or deprived
of any right he enjoys under the constitution, but by the law of the
land, or the judgment of his peers. Some gentlemen hold that the law of
the land will include an act of the legislature. But Lord Coke, that
great luminary of the law, in his comment upon a similar clause, in
Magna Charta, interprets the law of the land to mean presentment and
indictment, and process of outlawry, as contradistinguished from trial
by jury. But if there were any doubt upon the [state] constitution, the
[statutory] bill of rights enacted in this very session removes it. It is
there declared that, no man shall be disfranchised or deprived of any
right, but by due process of law, or the judgment of his peers. The

settled, known law, received and allowed by common consent to be the standard of right
and wrong, and the common measure to decide all controversies between them: for
though the law of Nature be plain and intelligible to all rational creatures; yet men being
biassed by their interest . . . are not apt to allow of it as a law binding to them in the
application of it to their particular cases. Secondly, in the state of Nature, there wants a
known and indifferent judge, with authority to determine all differences according to the
established law.
JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT (1689), §§ 123-125 (titled “Of the Ends of
Political Society and Government”). Locke’s requirement of an established, settled, and known law
is met by making natural law secondary to positive law. Locke’s requirement of common consent is
met by democratic lawmaking instead of judicial lawmaking. Locke and his followers wrote
elsewhere of their aversion to extemporaneous arbitrary legislative decrees; the Framers of the U.S.
Constitution addressed such concerns by, for example, adopting bicameralism and creating a
presidential veto, both of which promote legislative deliberation and stability. Some of the Framers
of the Bill of Rights probably would have ranked Locke’s “great and chief end” a bit lower in the
scheme of things, but in any event they saw Locke’s “end” as central to the Due Process Clause.
38. Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 276 (1855) (citation
omitted). The Murray Court also offered a persuasive explanation of why the language of the Due
Process Clause differs from that of Magna Carta. Id.
39. Ralph U. Witten, Constitutional Limitations on State-Court Jurisdiction: A HistoricalInterpretive Reexamination of the Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses (Part Two), 14
CREIGHTON L. REV. 735, 741 (1981).
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words “due process” have a precise technical import, and are only
applicable to the process and proceedings of the courts of justice; they
can never be referred to an act of legislature.40

Any confusion about the meaning of the phrase “law of the land” was
resolved in the federal context, because the Supremacy Clause
establishes that the law of the land does include legislative acts.
Disagreements about the meaning of the phrase “law of the land” in
state constitutions persisted long after the federal Constitution was
ratified. For example, in 1819, the New Hampshire courts scoffed at the
subjectivistic notion that an unenumerated right “can be protected from
the operation of a law of the land, by a clause in the [state] constitution,
declaring that it shall not be taken away, but by the law of the land.”41
Daniel Webster countered that not all legislative acts in New Hampshire
had the necessary qualities of “law.”42 Despite such controversies at the
40. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, Remarks on an Act for Regulating Elections (1787), reprinted
in 4 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 35 (Harold C. Syrett ed., Columbia Univ. Press 1962)
(1979) (emphasis added) (speech in legislature on February 6, 1787 urging that a proposed law
would violate due process). As to whether the phrase “law of the land” includes legislative acts, the
prevailing view in 1787 was that it did. See supra note 14 (Blackstone); infra note 59 (Coke). Even
if Hamilton’s minority view was taken as correct, he attributed a limited meaning to this phrase
“law of the land.” See text accompanying note 27 supra. As to the phrase “due process,” Hamilton
did not argue that the state bill of rights called for any particular process, as long as some judicial
proceeding occurred. Dictionaries confirm that “process” referred to “all the proceedings in any
action.” GILES JACOB, A NEW LAW DICTIONARY (1756). Notice that New York’s bill of rights used
the phrase “but by due process,” whereas the phrase “without due process” in the U.S. Constitution
does not necessarily require any process if none is due (analogously, many towns have ordinances
penalizing construction “without required permits,” but that does not mean permits are required for
all construction). See generally McKesson v. Florida, 496 U.S. 18, 37 (1990) (“a State need not
provide predeprivation process for the exaction of taxes”). New York proposed the “but by”
language for the federal Bill of Rights, but Madison preferred the more flexible “without” language.
See supra note 10.
41. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 1 N.H. 111, 129 (1817).
42. The case was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court which decided it on other grounds. See
Dartmouth v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 715 (1819). Daniel Webster’s argument to the Court relied
upon Blackstone, albeit selectively. See id. at 580-581. See generally supra note 14 and
accompanying text (Blackstone’s thoughts about the “law of the land” which Webster omitted).
Webster argued for a confining definition of “law,” by assuming that Blackstone’s definition of
“municipal law” applied to all law:
Municipal law . . . is properly defined to be “a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the
Supreme power in a state commanding what is right, and prohibiting what is ‘wrong.’”
Let us endeavor to explain its several properties, as they arise out of this definition. And,
first, it is a rule; not a transient sudden order from a superior to or concerning a particular
person; but something permanent, uniform and universal.
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 44 (Univ. of Chicago Press
1979) (facsimile of the first edition of 1765-1769). Webster only mentioned the last of these three
sentences to the Court. See Dartmouth, 17 U.S. at 580. Taking Webster’s argument to its
conclusion would empower the judiciary to have the final say regarding (as Blackstone put it) “what
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state level, those questions were answered in the context of the U.S.
Constitution by the convention in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787,
which decided what shall be a law and what shall be the supreme law of
the land. The Due Process Clause is consistent with that functional
definition of “law” in the original unamended Constitution.
As mentioned in the Introduction, the meaning of the word “due” in
the Due Process Clause can be independently confirmed by another line
of reasoning, if we consider the relationship of that Clause to slavery. It
is important to understand that the Fifth Amendment covered any
“person,” including slaves.43 A slave was entitled to Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights in federal criminal trials, and had legal rights in state
courts throughout the antebellum South.44 On its face, the Fifth
Amendment covered all persons including slaves, whereas some of the
other amendments did not.45 Salmon P. Chase (later the sixth Chief
is right” and “what is wrong.” Webster later acknowledged that the law of the land does not
inherently protect fundamental rights; he opposed slavery but believed that draconian laws for
returning fugitive slaves were the “law of the land.” See CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. 476484 (1850).
43. See infra note 45.
44. In much of the old South, slaves had a legal right to counsel, freedom from double
jeopardy, trial by jury in graver cases, and the right to grand jury indictment. THOMAS R. R. COBB,
AN INQUIRY INTO THE LAW OF NEGRO SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 268-269
(Univ. of Ga. Press 1999) (1858). The Supreme Court in Dred Scott wrongly declared that slaves
were not “persons” within the meaning of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Dred Scott v. Sandford,
60 U.S. 393, 411 (1856) (slaves not “embraced in any of the other provisions of the Constitution”
except those directly related to slavery). This was doubtless a ploy so that Chief Justice Taney
could then overextend the concept of due process without confronting the paradox that fugitive
slaves were entitled to due process like everyone else. See generally infra note 57 (Taney
employing substantive due process). Slave offenses were sometimes tried in special courts
employing summary procedures, and of course slavery was a cruel form of oppression, but slaves
had some legal rights, including the federal constitutional rights accorded to all other “persons.”
See generally infra note 46 (status of slavery laws in 1787).
45. The Fugitive Slave Clause described a slave as a “person.” See supra note 9 (reciting that
clause). Other clauses consistently classified slaves as “persons.” See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3
(counting slaves as three-fifths); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (addressing “importation” of slaves).
In contrast to the right of due process, slaves lacked other rights possessed by “the people.” See
generally United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990) (“[B]y contrast with the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments, [the Fourth] extends its reach only to ‘the people’”). Of course, “the
people” of the United States are its citizens, so the Fourth Amendment only applied to citizens. As
James Wilson explained, “it was necessary to observe the twofold relation in which the people
would stand. 1. as Citizens of the Genl. Govt. 2. as Citizens of their particular State. The Genl.
Govt. was meant for them in the first capacity: the State Govts. in the second.” 1 RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 405 (Max Farrand ed., Yale Univ. Press 1927) (1911). The
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment agreed with Wilson that the “people of the United States”
and “citizens” are synonymous. See AKHIL AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 171 (Yale Univ. Press
1998). See generally Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 587 (“not only slaves, but free persons of color, born in
some of the States, are not citizens”) (Curtis, J., dissenting); supra note 18 (New York’s bill of
rights distinguishing between citizens and persons).
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Justice of the U.S.) put it this way: “It is vain to say that the fugitive is
not a person, for the claim to him can be maintained only on the ground
that he is a person. It is vain to say that the [Fifth] [A]mendment did not
regard fugitives from service as persons within its intendment.”46 Justice
John McLean summed up the situation in 1841: “The Constitution treats
slaves as persons.”47 That Chase and McLean were right is evidenced by
the words of the leading Federalist in the New York ratification
convention: Alexander Hamilton plainly and clearly said that slaves “are
men, though degraded to the condition of slavery. They are persons
known to the municipal laws of the states which they inhabit, as well as
to the laws of nature.”48 While slaves were typically considered to be
outside of the political community, they were not legally considered to
be outside the community of persons.49 Plainly, the Fifth Amendment
was meant to cover slaves, even though the Fugitive Slave Clause

46. SALMON P. CHASE, RECLAMATION OF FUGITIVES FROM SERVICE: AN ARGUMENT FOR
THE DEFENDANT, SUBMITTED TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, AT THE DECEMBER

TERM, 1846, IN THE CASE OF WHARTON JONES VS. JOHN VANZANDT 89 (1847). See generally
Jones v. Van Zandt, 46 U.S. 215 (1847). The Virginia ratification convention proposed a federal
bill of rights that protected “freemen,” but the New York ratification convention changed “freemen”
to “person” in its proposed due process clause. See supra note 10 (ratification by New York); note
21 (ratification by Virginia). The Virginia ratification convention used the word “freemen” in
various of the other proposed amendments as well, but that word was ultimately not used in the U.S.
Constitution; this word (“freeman”) was only marginally less odious to the Framers than the word
“slave.” See 4 JONATHAN ELLIOTT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 176 (1836) (James Iredell explaining that “[t]he northern delegates,
owing to their particular scruples on the subject of slavery, did not choose the word slave to be
mentioned” in the Constitution) (original emphasis).
Five of the original thirteen states—New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode
Island, Pennsylvania—initiated programs of complete emancipation before the federal
Constitutional Convention met in 1787. The independent state of Vermont did likewise,
and New York and New Jersey followed very soon. These states abolished the foreign
and domestic slave trade. The Congress of the Confederation prohibited the introduction
of slaves into the Northwest Territory.
DWIGHT DUMOND, ANTISLAVERY: THE CRUSADE FOR FREEDOM IN AMERICA 27 (Univ. of Mich.
1961). The history of slavery in New York during the 1780s was complex. Slavery was not banned
in New York until 1799. Id. at 33. However, the New York legislature had voted to ban slavery in
1785, while also voting to withhold the right to vote, and on that basis the entire emancipation bill
was vetoed by New York’s Council of Revision. See “Objections by the Council of Revision to a
Bill for the Gradual Abolition of Slavery, March 23, 1785” in 2 MESSAGES FROM THE GOVERNORS
237-239 (Charles Z. Lincoln ed., Albany, J.B. Lyon Company 1909).
47. Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. 449, 506 (1841) (McLean, J., separate opinion). See also
Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 537 (“In the provision respecting the slave trade, in fixing the ratio of
representation, and providing for the reclamation of fugitives from labor, slaves were referred to as
persons, and in no other respect are they considered in the Constitution.” (McLean, J., dissenting)).
48. See supra note 10 (quoting Hamilton’s remarks in the New York Ratification
Convention).
49. Id.
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contemplated that runaway slaves would be returned. If one takes the
view that the Fugitive Slave Clause was merely an unenforceable
agreement between the states, so that both Congress and the Supreme
Court were mistaken when they asserted federal authority to enforce that
Clause, still the Due Process Clause would have destroyed that federally
sponsored agreement had due process subjectivistically protected the
fundamental liberties of persons.
The Supreme Court has held that the Constitution did not save a
fugitive slave who managed to escape out of his or her native state, vis a
vis enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Clause, “without the adoption of
which the Union could not have been formed.”50 In the same vein, the
leading Antifederalist in the New York ratification convention —
Melancton Smith — conceded that the Constitution gave privileges “to
those people who were so wicked as to keep slaves.”51 The only way
that the Due Process Clause can be reconciled with the Fugitive Slave
Clause is by understanding that “due process” is owed according to law
rather than according to subjectivistic notions of justice. Otherwise, the
Due Process Clause would have amended the Fugitive Slave Clause and
destroyed the Union.52 The Fugitive Slave Clause remains embedded in
the constitutional text, not only as a lesson in history, but also as a lesson
in the meaning of the Due Process Clause.53
50. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 611 (1842). See generally supra note 9 (recitation of
Fugitive Slave Clause). A “theory that declared slavery to be a violation of the due process clause
of the Fifth Amendment . . . . requires nothing more than a suspension of reason concerning the
origin, intent, and past interpretation of the clause.” ROBERT COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED 157 (Yale
Univ. Press 1975). Some nineteenth century abolitionists did not believe that Congress had power
to enforce the Fugitive Slave Clause: “Antislavery lawyers . . . conceived of Article IV as a
directive to the states with regard to their comity obligations. The states had the obligation to
determine their own institutional means to realize the constitutional objective of comity and
reciprocity.” Id. at 162-163. This theory was never accepted by the Court with regard to the
Fugitive Slave Clause. See Prigg, supra this note. The theory was eventually rejected completely
by the Supreme Court with regard to the rest of Article IV. See Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S.
219 (1987) (Rendition Clause); Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. 418 (1870) (Privileges and Immunities
Clause). Let us suppose, though, that Congress really had no power to directly enforce the Fugitive
Slave Clause by passage of implementing legislation. Still, under that Clause, at least some rights
of the slaveowner were self-executing. Prigg, 41 U.S. at 613. A federal court did not require any
further legislation by Congress in order to adjudicate those self-executing rights, and the federal
court would then plainly be obliged under the Constitution to help deprive the fugitive slave of his
hard-won liberty. The New Yorkers who framed the federal Due Process Clause manifestly did not
believe that such a deprivation of liberty would violate due process, even though they were not blind
to the cruelty and injustice of that deprivation.
51. See supra note 10 (quoting Smith’s remarks in the New York ratification convention).
52. This rationale is unrelated to the fact that the word “due” appears in both the Fugitive
Slave Clause and the Due Process Clause.
53. See generally supra note 9 (citing Kozminski). Regarding the Fugitive Slave Clause,
Lincoln said, “It is scarcely questioned that this provision was intended by those who made it, for
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The Fugitive Slave Clause furthermore teaches that the Framers
were familiar with using the word “due” in an objectivistic manner.
That clause clearly exemplifies usage of the word “due” in an
objectivistic sense that involves no subjectivistic role for judges, no
judicial ability to strike down statutes that are subjectivistically undue,
and no incorporation of natural rights or moral rights.54 This is not to
disparage natural rights or moral rights, but rather is to emphasize that
the Framers did not use the word “due” in a way that referred to those
rights.
In summary, the phrase “due process” had — and has — a precise
meaning. Due process of law refers to legal proceedings that are owed
according to law. Not surprisingly, then, the word “due” in the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments has the same objectivistic meaning as in the
original Constitution. The subjectivistic interpretation of the Due
Process Clause is completely at odds with the text, structure, and history
of the Constitution.
III. DEVELOPMENT OF A SUBJECTIVISTIC DUE PROCESS WAS A MISTAKE
In 1855, the Court delivered its first major decision regarding the
Due Process Clause. In Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land, the Court
indicated that the “law of the land” — and thus due process — generally
implies and includes not only conformity with the rest of the
Constitution but also implies and includes various rights of an accused
person such as “regular allegations, opportunity to answer, and a trial
according to some settled course of judicial proceedings.” The Murray
Court did not explain how it would go about picking which additional
unenumerated rights would be components of the due process
requirement, but the Court did describe a valid exception to that

the reclaiming of what we call fugitive slaves; and the intention of the law-giver is the law.”
Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), reprinted in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF
THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, H. DOC. NO. 93-208 at 120 (1989).
54. See supra note 9 (recitation of Fugitive Slave Clause). The Fugitive Slave Clause was
approved unanimously on August 29, 1787 by the constitutional convention. 2 RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 446 (Max Farrand ed., Yale Univ. Press 1937) (1911). The
northern states went out of their way on September 15, 1787 to eliminate any language that would
hint slavery might be a natural or moral right. Id. at 628 (“the term ‘legally’ was struck out, and
‘under the laws thereof’ inserted after the word ‘State,’ in compliance with the wish of some who
thought the term ‘legal’ equivocal, and favoring the idea that slavery was legal in a moral view”).
Although times can blind us to certain truths, the immorality of slavery was well-recognized by
many of the states ratifying the Due Process Clause, and those states did not believe that the word
“due” implied such morality. See generally infra notes 114 and 115 with accompanying text
(regarding morality).
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requirement, depending upon whether the process is longstanding and
was brought from England to America.55 The Murray Court held that
the statute in question fell within its historical transatlantic exception,
and therefore the Court did not require a trial under the circumstances of
that case.56
The Murray analysis was discarded several months later by the
Court in Dred Scott,57 in a generally infamous opinion delivered by
55. Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 277, 280 (1855).
Murray reflected the procedural understanding of “process” that predominated during the 1850s, in
the context of individual rights (or possibly Murray merely reflected the procedural nature of the
question that was at issue in that case). See JOHN BOUVIER, A LAW DICTIONARY ADAPTED TO THE
CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND OF THE SEVERAL STATES OF
THE AMERICAN UNION (7th ed. 1857) (defining “process” as the “means or method of
accomplishing a thing”); 4 COMPLETE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 211 (John G. Nicolay & John
Hay eds., Lincoln Memorial Univ. 1894) (“The Constitution itself impliedly admits that a person
may be deprived of property by ‘due process of law’”). Cf. supra note 7 (the word “process” in
1789 suggested substantive content). Regarding Murray’s historical exception to the due process
requirement, this exception was patterned after the Court’s treatment of other constitutional rights
which, “from time immemorial, [had] been subject to certain well-recognized exceptions, arising
from the necessities of the case.” Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897).
56. Prior to Murray, the Court had only briefly commented upon the words “law of the land,”
which were copied from Magna Carta into the Maryland Constitution:
[A]fter volumes spoken and written with a view to their exposition, the good sense of
mankind has at length settled down to this: that they were intended to secure the
individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government, unrestrained by the
established principles of private rights and distributive justice.
Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 US 235, 244 (1819); cf. case cited supra note 41 (New Hampshire
judiciary construing “law of the land” in 1817). Regarding Okely, the Court did not discuss Magna
Carta at length or cite supporting references. Okely did not address whether the “law of the land”
clause was intended to secure justice and private rights by requiring executive officers to follow the
laws, or by also restraining legislation. The Court would later acknowledge that the greatest
security for fundamental principles of liberty and justice “resides in the right of the people to make
their own laws, and alter them at their pleasure.” Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535 (1884).
Okely was not cited by any justice in either Murray or Dred Scott, which were the two main due
process cases leading up to the Fourteenth Amendment.
57. Dred Scott was the first case in which a federal court struck down a statute as violative of
the Due Process Clause:
[A]n act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States of his liberty or
property, merely because he came himself or brought his property [i.e. slaves] into a
particular Territory of the United States [from a slave state], and who had committed no
offence against the laws, could hardly be dignified with the name of due process of law.
Dred Scott, 60 U.S. 393, 450 (1857). Justice Curtis’ dissent included a much longer discussion of
due process than the majority offered. Id. at 626-627. Prior to Dred Scott, only a few state courts
had struck down statutes using state “due process” or “law of the land” clauses. See, e.g.,
Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378 (1856). The leading Wynehamer case involved a statutory
prohibition on sale of alcoholic beverages already in existence at the time of the statute’s passage; a
majority of the state court held that “due process” was violated by forbidding sales before the
existing stock was exhausted. The rationale of Wynehamer was subsequently rejected by the U.S.
Supreme Court. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 657, 669 (1887):
The single sale of which he [Mugler] was found guilty occurred . . . after the act . . .
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Roger Taney, the fifth Chief Justice of the U.S. Justice Curtis, who had
authored the opinion in Murray, wrote a long and famous dissent in
Dred Scott, in which he too discarded his own analysis in Murray; his
Dred Scott dissent addressed due process without mentioning the
historic law of England, and without citing Murray.58
Skipping ahead a few decades, the Court revisited the Murray
analysis in Hurtado v. California, and correctly explained that various
court procedures such as grand jury indictment had merely been the
actual existing law of the land, as opposed to having been inherent in the
phrase “law of the land.”59 The Hurtado Court thus again discarded the
dictum in Murray that had indicated the “law of the land” normally
demanded allegations, answer, trial, and the like.60 The Hurtado Court
instead announced that alternative procedures may generally be
acceptable, even if they lack a historical pedigree, so that future
took effect, and was of beer manufactured before its passage. . . . The exercise of the
police power by the destruction of property which is itself a public nuisance, or the
prohibition of its use in a particular way, whereby its value becomes depreciated, is very
different from taking property for public use, or from depriving a person of his property
without due process of law.
Wynehamer was not a typical case, and state courts usually reached the opposite conclusion. See,
e.g., State v. Keeran, 5 R.I. 497, 504-507 (1858) (rejecting a subjectivistic interpretation of Rhode
Island’s “law of the land” clause). See generally CHARLES G. HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL
LAW CONCEPTS 75-142 (1930) (extensively describing antebellum jurisprudence regarding due
process).
58. Id.
59. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 516. The Court in Murray had said that “‘due process of law’
generally implies and includes actor, reus, judex, regular allegations, opportunity to answer, and a
trial according to some settled course of judicial proceedings . . . .” Murray, 59 U.S. at 280 (citing
Lord Coke). In contrast, the Court in Hurtado indicated that each of the procedures cited by Lord
Coke was merely, “an example and illustration of due process of law as it actually existed in cases
in which it was customarily used.” Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 523. See generally infra note 86 (further
discussing the grand jury right). The Hurtado Court explained Lord Coke’s actual position: “In
beginning his commentary on this chapter of Magna Charta, 2 Inst. 46, Coke says . . . ‘no man be
taken or imprisoned but per legem terrae, that is, by the common law, statute law, or custom of
England.’” Id. Lord Coke’s position that the law of the land includes statutes is amply supported
by English case law:
[I]t is objected, that by Mag. Chart. c. 29, no man ought to be taken or imprisoned, but
by the law of the land. But to this I answer, that lex terrae is not confined to the common
law, but takes in all the other laws, which are in force in this realm; as the civil and
canon law . . . . By the 28 Ed. 3, c. 3, there the words lex terrae, which are used in Mag.
Char. are explained by the words, due process of law; and the meaning of the statute is,
that all commitments must be by a legal authority. And the law of Parliament is as much
a law as any; nay, if there be any superiority, this is a superior law.
Regina v. Paty, 92 Eng. Rep. 232, 234 (K.B. 1704) (emphasis supplied) (Justice Powys concluding
that Parliament’s rules take precedence over common law). It is impossible that the term “due
process” was employed by the Framers of the Fifth Amendment in a sense different from that which
had been affixed to it by the common law.
60. See Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 537.
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legislatures would not have their hands tied by previous legislatures.61
Murray was relevant after Hurtado only in the sense that it (1) required
that a “due” process enacted by statute must conform with all other
constitutional requirements, and (2) specified a historical transatlantic
exception to whatever additional due process limitation might exist — or
might not exist. These were the two basic holdings of Murray, and the
second holding was particularly unsettled in view of the attempt by
Justice Curtis to modify it in his Dred Scott dissent, and in view of the
Hurtado Court’s recognition that the second Murray holding amounted
to an exception without a rule.
The Hurtado Court, rather than concluding that the Due Process
Clause simply guarantees the totality of legal rights and proceedings that
are owed according to the law of the land (i.e. according to positive law
as well as compatible common law), instead went on to exalt vague
principles of liberty, justice, and general constitutional law that had
previously been described by the Court in an unrelated decision
delivered by Justice Samuel Miller.62 The Hurtado Court, which was
reviewing a decision of the California Supreme Court, entirely
overlooked Justice Miller’s caveat that the Court could not take
jurisdiction of those “principles of general constitutional law . . . [unless
it was] sitting in review of a Circuit Court of the United States, as [it
was] in Loan Association v. Topeka.”63 Unlike Hurtado, Topeka
involved diversity of citizenship. Disregarding Miller’s warning, the
Hurtado Court inferred from the Topeka case that the Court had a
measure of authority to preserve nebulous “principles of liberty and
justice” so as to strike down otherwise valid laws of the land.64 This
61. Id.
62. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 536-37, citing Loan Assoc. v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655, 662 (1875).
63. Davidson v. City of New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 105 (1877) (citation omitted) citing
Topeka, 87 U.S. 655 (Topeka did not rely on any constitutional provision). The Supreme Court has
repeatedly emphasized what it said in Davidson: that a holding like Topeka’s is inapplicable to
situations like Hurtado where the Court is reviewing a state supreme court decision. See Fallbrook
v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 155 (1896); see also infra note 118 (discussing Fletcher). Topeka was
based upon the Court’s diversity jurisdiction, and was entirely subject to modification by the people
and supreme court of Kansas; the Hurtado Court overlooked this vital aspect of Topeka. It is
doubtful whether Topeka itself was correctly decided, and Justice Clifford offered a persuasive
dissent. Topeka, 87 U.S. at 667. A legitimate rationale for the Topeka decision would have been to
say that an unjust law authorizing state-sponsored robbery, and taking from A to benefit B for
strictly private purposes, is a law that forces A to serve B, thus creating involuntary servitude under
color of law, in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment (note that robbery without — instead of with
— state authorization has traditionally been handled by the states rather than the federal
government). See generally supra note 9 (discussing Thirteenth Amendment).
64. See Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 537. See also supra note 63 (discussing Topeka). These vague
principles of liberty and justice, which Hurtado mistakenly inferred from Topeka, proceeded to leap
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limitlessly flexible standard, incorporated into due process jurisprudence
by the Hurtado Court, motivated the judiciary in subsequent years to
overturn countless statutes that were enacted with the precise legislative
goal of advancing fundamental principles of life, liberty, and justice.
The Hurtado Court furthermore added another exception to due
process requirements, supplementing the historical transatlantic
exception already established in Murray, so that a state statute would be
held consistent with the Due Process Clause if an identical federal
statute would violate any other part of the Bill of Rights.65 In other
words, the Hurtado Court held that another part of the Bill of Rights
would be superfluous if the Due Process Clause were broad enough to
accomplish the same thing, and thus the Hurtado Court decided that
California could go ahead and prosecute people by information instead
of by the ancient method of grand jury indictment, because the
Fourteenth Amendment contains no explicit grand jury requirement.
This superfluousness exception described in Hurtado has since been
abandoned, but Hurtado’s mistaken reliance on Topeka has never been
abandoned and still misdirects the Court’s jurisprudence.
If ever there was a complex Supreme Court decision, Hurtado is it.
Parts of that opinion are very well reasoned and remain good authority,
but other parts are neither.
In recent decades, the historical transatlantic exception described in
Murray has met the same demise as the superfluousness exception
described in Hurtado, thus further increasing the Court’s asserted ability
to restrain legislatures and strike down statutes based upon judicially
determined principles of liberty and justice. The Murray Court had said
that a process is automatically “due” if it has an ancient English and
colonial pedigree, and Hurtado subsequently endorsed that holding of
Murray, but the Court nowadays has largely abandoned it. The current
Court strikes down even ancient statutes that the Court deems
illegitimate, irrational, or insufficiently compelling.66
from one opinion to the next. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965)
(Goldberg, J., concurring, joined by Warren, C.J. & Brennan, J.) (The due process inquiry “is
whether a right involved is of such a character that it cannot be denied without violating those
fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political
institutions.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted, emphasis added). Hurtado also drew
inferences from Okely (discussed supra note 56), and from Daniel Webster (discussed supra note
42). The Hurtado majority, and Justice Harlan’s dissent, used the phrase “principles of liberty and
justice” a total of seven times, and it therefore seems unlikely that this critical phrase was used
merely for rhetorical effect. Cf. Robert Reeder, Constitutional and Extra-Constitutional Restraints,
61 U. PA. L. REV. 441, 453 n.27 (1913) (also faulting Hurtado’s “parity of reason” argument).
65. See Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 537.
66. Justice Scalia characterizes this abandonment of the ancient pedigree exception as a
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The Court in Lawrence purported to modify the ancient pedigree
concept (i.e. “we think that our laws and traditions in the past half
century are of most relevance here”). But the Lawrence Court then
proceeded to strike down ancient statutes that had been widespread
within the past half century (i.e. “before 1961 all 50 States had outlawed
sodomy”).67
Murray’s historical exception, and the superfluousness exception
added by Hurtado, have both now been largely pushed aside, and so
Hurtado’s mistaken inferences from Topeka are infecting the Court’s
due process jurisprudence now more than ever. Of course, even if those
two exceptions had not been pushed aside, still there would be no
justification for generally construing due process in a manner contrary to
the Framers’ clear and ordained intent. In truth, both the Murray
historical transatlantic exception, and the Hurtado superfluousness
exception always rested on shaky ground. Against the Hurtado
superfluousness exception, it could be argued that the specific
enumerated rights are useful in the Constitution as important examples
of due process, and are therefore not pointless redundancies. Against the
Murray historical transatlantic exception, it could be argued that the Due
Process Clause does not explicitly say anything about history, and that,
even if we look at the intent of the New York Antifederalists who
demanded that the Clause be inserted into the Constitution, they were
interested in securing common law rights that were then in use, rather
than securing common law rights that were then of ancient vintage. This
article does not contend that either the Murray historical transatlantic
exception or the Hurtado superfluousness exception should be
reinstated, but rather contends that the whole subjectivistic due process

consequence of incorporating the Bill of Rights into the Due Process Clause. See Pacific Mutual v.
Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 35 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“disregard of ‘the procedure
of the ages’ for incorporation purposes has led to its disregard more generally”). Justice Scalia has
also said that, “It is precisely the historical practices that define what is ‘due.’” Schad v. Arizona,
501 U.S. 624, 650 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis in original). However,
Justice Scalia nevertheless has conceded that a departure from tradition may be “due” if it
subjectively appears to be fundamentally fair (“‘Fundamental fairness’ analysis may appropriately
be applied to departures from traditional American conceptions of due process . . .”). Id.
Incidentally, Hurtado’s superfluousness exception was explicitly rejected in Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45, 65-66 (1932). However, Powell did not reject Hurtado’s much more irresistable
conclusion that the two due process clauses have the same basic meaning.
67. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571-73 (2003). The Court’s stated rationale was that in
1961 the sodomy laws were incompletely enforced (unlike abortion laws). See generally infra note
109 (difference between legalizing a crime legislatively versus tying a legislature’s hands
constitutionally). Incidentally, throughout this article, the term “sodomy” is used as a legal term, in
the same way it is used in Lawrence, and is not meant to be pejorative.
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doctrine, which both of those exceptions once limited, is basically
illegitimate. The subjectivistic due process doctrine should not be tamed
by exceptions, or rescued by an unconvincing limitation to procedural
matters only, but rather should be consigned to history.
The Supreme Court has intermittently returned to the objectivistic
interpretation of the word “due” that had sporadically been
acknowledged before Hurtado, for example in a pre-Hurtado opinion
delivered by Morrison Waite (the seventh Chief Justice of the U.S.):
Due process is process due according to the law of the land. This
process in the States is regulated by the law of the [S]tate. Our power
over that law is only to determine whether it is in conflict with the
supreme law of the land, — that is to say, with the Constitution and
laws of the United States made in pursuance thereof, — or with any
treaty made under the authority of the United States.68

Often, however, the Court has not restrained itself, and has
frequently used the Due Process Clause to strike down what are now
considered the most essential types of statutes. 69 The Court has not
devised any way to prevent this from happening again. The obvious
way for the Court to prevent recurrent legislation from the bench would
be by hewing to the objectivistic interpretation of “due” process that is
supported by the historical record underlying the Bill of Rights, and is
mandated by the very structure of the Constitution.
The objectivistic interpretation of the “Due” Process Clause does
restrain Congress, as the Court in both Murray and Hurtado insisted the
Clause ought to do, and in fact the Clause imposes a greater restraint on
Congress than the restraint imposed by other constitutional provisions,

68. Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 93 (1875). See also Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726
(1963) (effectively employing an objectivistic interpretation of the word “due”). Justice Brandeis
once famously wrote as follows: “Despite arguments to the contrary which had seemed to me
persuasive, it is settled that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to matters
of substantive law as well as to matters of procedure.” Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring, joined by Holmes, J.). It is assumed in this article that Brandeis
was correct that due process does apply to matters of substance. See supra note 7. However,
Brandeis then made the following deduction: “Thus all fundamental rights comprised within the
term liberty are protected by the federal Constitution from invasion by the states.” Whitney, 274
U.S. at 373. It is this deduction, that the present article contests. See generally infra note 114 and
accompanying text (Holmes and Brandeis taking a different view of due process in 1930, after
laissez faire economics had given way to the Great Depression in 1929).
69. See generally Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 998 (1992) (“Both Dred Scott
and one line of the cases resisting the New Deal rested upon the concept of ‘substantive due
process’ that the Court praises and employs today.”) (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting, joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., White, J., & Thomas, J.).
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such as the Third Amendment during wartime.70 To understand the
restraint imposed on Congress by the objectivistic interpretation of due
process, suppose for example that Congress wants to make sure accused
persons are not denied Sixth Amendment compulsory process to obtain
witnesses.71 Congress may not remedy this type of Sixth Amendment
violation by requiring reduced sentences for those prisoners erroneously
deprived of their Sixth Amendment rights, nor may Congress remedy
this type of violation by preserving the sentences while offering the
prisoners some other compensation, or by penalizing the judge who
made the error. Instead, the Due Process Clause requires that Congress
must either respect all of the accused persons’ process rights, or let them
have their liberty. This is a real and significant restraint on Congress,
and a similar restraint applies to the executive and judiciary: providing
most of a person’s process rights is not good enough.
Justice Joseph Bradley once said that “we are entitled, under the
fourteenth amendment, not only to see that there is some process of law,
but ‘due process of law,’ provided by the State law when a citizen is
deprived. . . .”72 Justice Bradley was correct, in the sense that a mere
portion of legal process will not be allowed, when more is required by
positive law. Failure to provide all process that is due may not normally
be treated as harmless error, according to the Due Process Clause, and
statutes may not normally treat it as such.
The Supreme Court has in recent decades added increasingly
stringent due process restraints on Congress and the states, pursuant to
its mistakes in Hurtado. With regard to procedural law, the Court has
developed a test for determining what process is “due” by balancing
three factors: (1) the nature and weight of the private interest affected,

70. “It is manifest that it was not left to the legislative power to enact any process which
might be devised. The article is a restraint on the legislative as well as on the executive and judicial
powers of the government . . . .” Murray, 59 U.S. at 276. See also Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 535 (The
Due Process Clause is not “too vague and indefinite to operate as a practical restraint” on
Congress.); Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 102 (1877) (“[C]an a state make anything due
process of law which, by its own legislation, it chooses to declare such? To affirm this is to affirm
that the prohibition to the states is to no avail . . . .”). The Third Amendment states that, “No soldier
shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the owner, nor in time of
war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.” U.S. CONST. amend. III.
71. The Sixth Amendment states that, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right . . . to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor . . . .” U.S. CONST.
amend VI.
72. Davidson, 96 U.S. at 107 (Bradley, J., concurring). As the Court stated in Murray, the
Due Process Clause requires that, “We must examine the constitution itself, to see whether this
process be in conflict with any of its provisions.” Murray, 59 U.S. at 277 (emphasis added). This is
how the Due Process Clause restrains Congress.
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(2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of this interest using existing
procedures compared with alternative or additional procedures, and (3)
the government’s concern with both the interest involved and the
procedures used to regulate it.73 Unfortunately, the rationale of a
majority (or supermajority) of the people’s representatives is not even a
factor here, much less a determinative factor of what procedure is “due.”
Likewise for substantive law, the general position of the Court is now
that when a fundamental interest is at stake involving life, liberty, or
property, then the state must have a “compelling” objective, and its
statute must be narrowly tailored to achieve that objective. In cases
involving non-fundamental interests, the state must have a “legitimate”
objective, and a statute must be rationally related to achieving that
objective. The Court thus determines what powers of state government
are legitimate or compelling, regardless of the enumeration of powers in
a state’s constitution. The Court also determines what rights are
fundamental, notwithstanding rights that may be enumerated in a state’s
constitution. In this way, the Court now decides what laws are due or
undue, and what the law of the land should be.
This current interpretation of the Due Process Clause cannot be
reconciled with, among other things, the first sentence of the
Constitution: “All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and a
House of Representatives.”74 The increasingly large assumption of
power by the Supreme Court traces back to the Court’s mistaken
reliance in Hurtado upon its previous Topeka opinion, which had been
confined to diversity cases only, and which did not even mention due
process.
The Court increasingly asserts that the principles of liberty and
justice espoused by elected legislators and the voting public do not
comport with due process. Of course, the Court is entitled to believe
that other principles are more desirable, but that is not sufficient cause
for imposition of the Court’s principles upon legislatures by virtue of the
Due Process Clause.
73. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 931-932 (1997) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
74. U.S. CONST. art 1, § 1. See also THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 23 (U.S.
1776) (blasting the King of England for “abolishing our most valuable laws”); INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919, 954 (1983) (“Amendment and repeal of statutes, no less than enactment, must conform
with Art. I.” (footnote omitted)). It is true that the Due Process Clause could in principle have
amended the first sentence of the Constitution, but the Framers of the Due Process Clause said no
change in the original Constitution was needed or intended. See supra note 10 (quoting New York’s
ratification resolution).
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IV. CONSTRUING THE WORD “DUE” IN A SUBJECTIVISTIC WAY HAS
SLIPPERY CONSEQUENCES
Cases like Lawrence v. Texas have ostensibly not involved any
struggle between different people’s individual liberties. However, in
other cases, the courts have often decided whose competing substantive
liberties should be supported by the government, and whose should be
opposed. Lawrence did not pit the liberty of grandparents against the
liberty of parents,75 or the liberty of mothers against the liberty of
fathers,76 or the liberty of employees against the liberty of employers,77
or the liberty of slaves against the liberty of their enslavers.78 However,
the Lawrence decision surely will be cited the next time the Court
decides whose unenumerated “fundamental” rights should triumph over
the liberties of others.
Liberty comes in many shapes and sizes (including Lebensraum
which literally means “living space”), and the Court’s asserted ability to
75. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (the state must bar grandparents’ visitation at
behest of parents). Generally speaking, the Court has recognized the error in assuming “that one
disposition can expand a ‘liberty’ . . . without contracting an equivalent ‘liberty’ on the other side.”
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130 (1989) (explaining that “[s]uch a happy choice is rarely
available”). However, the Court’s recognition of competing liberty interests has not stopped it from
expanding some liberties while contracting others. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52, 93 (1976) (“A father’s interest in having a child - perhaps his only child - may be
unmatched by any other interest in his life.”) (White, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., &
Rehnquist, J.). Even in a case like Lawrence, the rights of some people may contract as those of
others expand (e.g. Lawrence may portend the end for laws that establish and protect a child’s legal
right to preferably have both a mother and a father). Incidentally, note that the Due Process Clause
does not explicitly say to whom the process is owed. See generally Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
U. S. 97, 122 (1934) (“[J]ustice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also.”).
76. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Ex-Boyfriend Loses Bid to Halt an Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6,
2002 at A10. Of course, some fathers and mothers seek abortions together. See, e.g., THEODORE
ROOSEVELT, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 305 (Charles Scribner’s Sons 1925) (1913) (“a physician of
wealth and high standing had seduced a girl and then induced her to commit abortion—I rather lost
my temper, and wrote to the individuals who had asked for the pardon, saying that I extremely
regretted that it was not in my power to increase the sentence”). The Court has also invalidated
legislation securing a right of law-abiding husbands to find out about abortions afterward, and thus
clinics now have no duty of subsequent notification. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
897-898 (1992). Incidentally, the prospect of a woman’s husband learning of an abortion might
dissuade her from seeking it, but would not impose a prior restraint, because she would still be able
to get the abortion.
77. See Lochner v New York, 198 US 45, 69 (1905) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (The necessities
of employees may have “compelled them to submit to such exactions as unduly taxed their
strength.”) The legislation at issue in Lochner was intended to liberate workers, and to protect their
rights from being coercively taken from them. The same can be said of other labor legislation
struck down by the Court during the period leading up to the Great Depression. Surely, the right to
go home after working ten long hours in a bakery is a personal liberty, and the U.S. Supreme Court
deprived employees of that inalienable liberty.
78. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856) supra note 57.
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deprive some people of liberty while granting it to others is problematic,
even if the Court is kindly and well-intentioned.79 The plain language of
the Due Process Clause does not distinguish between protected liberties
and other liberties; this clause was meant to prohibit unlawful
deprivation of any liberty. Nevertheless, the Court has implicitly
established at least three classes of liberty interests: absolutely protected
fundamental liberties, legislatively protectable non-fundamental
liberties, and forbidden liberties (i.e. liberties that come into conflict
with the absolutely protected liberties). The U.S. Supreme Court allows
no legislature, no state or federal statute, and no state constitution to
provide any security at all for this last class of liberties.
The slippery slope gets longer, steeper, and slipperier if we consider
that the judiciary is now paving the way for striking down whatever laws
it feels are fundamentally flawed, as long as the law somehow deprives a
person of life, liberty, or property. There is nothing in the language or
pre-constitutional history of the Due Process Clause that would limit the
use of that clause to privacy-related issues. 80
It is true that a citizen has a moral duty to disobey a very unjust
law, and judges are indeed citizens. However, judges need not use their
government offices for this purpose. The greatest acts of civil
disobedience have been profoundly respectful of both the law, and of the
community’s will, and have attempted to nullify neither. For example,
Martin Luther King eloquently wrote the following from a Birmingham
jail:
One who breaks an unjust law must do so openly, lovingly, and with a
willingness to accept the penalty. I submit that an individual who
breaks a law that conscience tells him is unjust and who willingly
accepts the penalty of imprisonment in order to arouse the conscience
of the community over its injustice, is in reality expressing the highest

79. See generally infra note 122 and accompanying text (remarks of Oliver Ellsworth). The
abortion issue exemplifies that the Supreme Court can be just as arbitrary and legislative as
Congress:
The [Roe v. Wade] opinion’s author, Justice Harry A. Blackmun, said in one internal
court memo that he was drawing “arbitrary” lines about the times during pregnancy
when a woman could legally receive an abortion. In another memo, Justice Potter
Stewart, who joined the Blackmun opinion, said the determination in the opinion about
these lines was “legislative.”
Bob Woodward, The Abortion Papers, WASHINGTON POST, January 22, 1989, at D1 (emphasis
added).
80. Even if there were such a limitation, a vast number of existing laws might easily be
characterized as intruding upon privacy (e.g. laws against child abuse, spousal rape, dueling, et
cetera).
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respect for law.81

A central problem with the Supreme Court having carte blanche
authority to invalidate all laws that are fundamentally unfair is that
federal judges do not represent the community, and can only exercise
carte blanche power at the expense of the community’s authority. By
reading carte blanche powers into the Due Process Clause, the clause is
now left with “no definite meaning”82 beyond what the Supreme Court
subjectivistically decides. On top of all that, the Court’s ever-increasing
and controversial reliance upon a misinterpretation of the Due Process
Clause has set a harmful precedent that threatens the clear, ordained, and
established meaning of every other provision of law, while perhaps
making the Court more reluctant to assert itself in other matters where it
was meant to be involved.
V. CONSTRUING THE WORD “DUE” IN AN OBJECTIVISTIC WAY HAS
MANAGEABLE CONSEQUENCES
There would not be as great an upheaval as one might think if the
Supreme Court were to return to a plausible interpretation of due
process. In other words, if the Court were to acknowledge that “due

81. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHY WE CAN’T WAIT 86 (Harper & Row 1964). The
concept of civil disobedience is closely related to jury nullification. Courts have typically held that a
juror’s adherence to a higher law is just cause for the juror’s dismissal. See, e.g., U.S. v. Thomas
116 F.3d 606, 617 (2d Cir. 1997). But, if the judge only finds out about the juror’s nonconformist
legal views after the verdict, then it’s too late, because judges may not set aside a jury’s verdict of
not guilty. See Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 105-107 (1895). Thus, jury nullification is
complex. In contrast, the inability of judges to nullify statutes contrary to higher law is simple: the
Constitution not only requires that judges be bound by positive law, but also requires that they
swear to it. U.S. CONST. Art. VI. cl 2-3. The risk of jury nullification can be reduced by increasing
the number of jurors needed to nullify. See generally Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 136 (1979)
(“a jury’s verdict need not be unanimous to satisfy constitutional requirements”). Likewise,
Congress can increase the number of Supreme Court justices needed to nullify a statute. See
generally Jed Shugerman, A Six-Three Rule: Reviving Consensus and Deference on the Supreme
Court, 37 GA. L. REV. 893, 971 (2003) (Congress can require a supermajority of justices to
invalidate a statute.). Totally removing an issue from the jurisdiction of the federal courts would be
more problematic than altering the courts’ voting rules, because the judicial power extends to all
cases arising under the Constitution.
82. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 106 (1877) (“The party complaining here appeared,
and had a full and fair hearing in the court of the first instance, and afterwards in the supreme court.
If this be not due process of law, then the words can have no definite meaning as used in the
constitution”). The slope gets slipperier still, inasmuch as the Lawrence Court offered no objective
constitutional basis for confining its holding to sodomy, without extending to things like adult
incest, bigamy, narcotics, bestiality, suicide, prostitution, and adultery, all of which are subjectively
very different. Control of these and so many other issues now remains in the hands of the American
people only at the pleasure of the high Court.
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process of law” does not pledge “due laws,”83 then many of the
individual rights that the Court has sought to protect using the Due
Process Clause would still be protected without additional constitutional
amendments.
Instead of applying some or all of the Bill of Rights amendments to
the states via the Due Process Clause, that can be done via the Privileges
or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as the Framers
intended. Congressman John Bingham explained as follows:
[M]any instances of State injustice and oppression have already
occurred in the State legislation of this Union, of flagrant violations of
the guarantied privileges of citizens of the United States, for which the
national Government furnished and could furnish by law no remedy
whatever. Contrary to the express letter of your Constitution, ‘cruel
and unusual punishments’ have been inflicted under State laws within
this Union upon citizens, not only for crimes committed, but for sacred
duty done, for which and against which the Government of the United
States had provided no remedy and could provide none.84

Bingham was the lead author of the Fourteenth Amendment, and he
plainly intended for the rights that were spelled out in the Constitution to
be secured by the Privileges or Immunities Clause against deprivation by
the states. The explicit Due Process Clause was merely inserted into the
Fourteenth Amendment to ensure that all non-citizens would receive due
process alongside citizens,85 just as the Due Process Clause in the Fifth
83. See generally Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (“[E]qual protection of the
laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.”). Equal protection may be impossible if laws are
unequal, but due process of law can exist even when the laws are not rightful (by construing the
word “due” in its objectivist sense).
84. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2542 (1866) quoted in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 241 (1972) (emphasis added) (Douglas, J., concurring). On April 21, 1866 the joint committee
drafting the Fourteenth Amendment explicitly rejected draft language that included a right to
compensation (along the lines of the Fifth Amendment) in combination with the equal protection
right. The joint committee subsequently approved language combining equal protection, due
process, and privileges or immunities, but leaving out the right to just compensation. See MICHAEL
KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF
RIGHTS 83 (Duke Univ. Press 1986). It may well have been that the joint committee viewed the
initial language as being much too narrowly focused on the compensation right, and may well have
wanted to accept nothing less than broader language. Thus, the joint committee’s explicit rejection
of a compensation right should not be construed as an indication that the Framers wanted to let the
states violate that right. On the contrary, they wanted the states to respect that right. See Adamson
v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 105-107 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting Senator Howard’s Senate
speech of May 23, 1866).
85. See Akhil Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L. J. 1193,
1224-1225 (1992) (extensively quoting the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment). One could
argue that the Equal Protection Clause, supra note 2, already extends all of the privileges and
immunities of citizens (including the due process right) to aliens as well. However, it does not seem
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Amendment covers both citizens and non-citizens.
The grand jury right in the Fifth Amendment has not as of yet been
applied to the states by the courts, but if it was applied via the Privileges
or Immunities Clause then defendants could waive that right whenever a
state offers a preferable alternative method, such as prosecution by
information.86 There would also be no harm in applying the Seventh
Amendment to the states because every state already requires juries in
civil cases and, moreover, the obsolete dollar amount in the Seventh
Amendment has not caused any problem in jurisdictions where it now
applies (e.g. in the District of Columbia and West Virginia).87
Application of the Second Amendment to the states would have an
unclear effect, because the courts have not decided whether that
amendment confers a citizen’s right to keep and bear arms, or merely a
right of state militia members to keep and bear arms.88 With regard to
reasonable to suppose that the Equal Protection Clause was meant to render completely meaningless
the distinction in the Fourteenth Amendment between U.S. citizens and other persons. By requiring
states to provide full Bill of Rights protections to aliens, the courts would be depriving the executive
branch of critical leverage in trying to negotiate reciprocal protection for U.S. citizens abroad.
Aliens were apparently meant to have partial rather than full Bill of Rights protection, as against
state action. Even against federal action, aliens were not intended to have full Bill of Rights
protection. See supra note 45 (“the people” refers only to citizens).
86. United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 202 (1995) (waiver of indictment is
constitutionally permissible). The Court declined to apply the grand jury right (i.e. presentment and
indictment) to the states in Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884). Hurtado has not been
reversed. Justice Scalia has cited Joseph Story for the idea that due process requires “due
presentment or indictment, and being brought in to answer thereto by due process of the common
law.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2661 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Story was simply
reporting what Lord Coke had said. See 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES §1783, p. 661 (1833); see also supra note 59 (pointing out that Coke has
been misconstrued on this point). Mr. Hamdi was held on suspicion without criminal charges, and
so the Fourth Amendment required that his continued seizure be reasonable. Normally, “it is
unreasonable to send a prisoner, and not to signify withal the crimes alleged against him.” 1
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 133 (Univ. of Chicago Press
1765). Strangely, the Fourth Amendment was not mentioned in Hamdi.
87. Margaret L. Moses, What the Jury Must Hear, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 183, 185 n.10
(2000) (in “the two states where the civil jury trial right is not constitutionally based, it is
nonetheless provided either by statute or court rule”). The Court declined to apply the civil jury
right to the states in Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92 (1875). Walker has not been reversed. See
generally W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 13 (using a threshold amount of twenty dollars as in the U.S.
Constitution).
88. See United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 264 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that the Second
Amendment does grant an individual right to bear arms). Contra Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d
1052, 1092 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S.Ct. 803 (2003). The Court declined to apply the
Second Amendment to the states in Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886), and Presser has not
been reversed, as of yet. To the extent that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment may have
misconstrued the meaning of the Second Amendment, they clearly proposed their Privileges or
Immunities Clause in 1866 so that the rights that already restrained the federal government would
thenceforth restrain the states too — not so rights that did not really restrain the federal government
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rights that the Court has applied against the government without
reference to any specific enumerated right, some of those rights could
also be protected based upon existing constitutional provisions, whereas
others would instead have to rely upon existing federal statutes or state
law, or upon new constitutional amendments.89
The long-dormant Privileges or Immunities Clause could be safely
resuscitated if the courts recognize that it only encompasses those
fundamental rights that already confer protection from the federal
would restrain the states (or vice versa). In other words, the basic intention in 1866 was to defer to
past and future court decisions regarding the pre-existing Constitution. See supra note 15 (quoting
Bingham and Howard). See also supra note 45 (the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
correctly construed the meaning of “the people”).
89. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 95 (2000) (“Pierce and Meyer, had they been
decided in recent times, may well have been grounded upon First Amendment principles”)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). Cf. Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923) (Holmes, J, dissenting, joined
by Sutherland, J.) (companion case to Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)). Statutes robbing
from person A and giving to B would often be invalid as involuntary servitude (i.e. A involuntarily
serves B). See supra note 63 (discussing Thirteenth Amendment). Discriminatory sodomy laws
could also be invalidated — if Justice O’Connor is correct. See supra note 8. With respect to
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (due process used to desegregate schools), Congress never
“required that the schools of the District of Columbia be segregated.” MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL in
WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID 168 (Jack M. Balkin ed., N. Y. Univ.
Press 2001). In civil cases, the prospect of a Seventh Amendment jury trial would give parties
leverage to seek unenumerated procedural protections in return for waiving the jury trial right. See
supra note 87. See generally Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 405 (1993) (“the Eighth Amendment
requires increased reliability of the process . . .”). Regarding contraceptives, Congress can
counteract state laws adverse to interstate commerce in contraceptives (commerce in liquor is
another matter, according to the Twenty-First Amendment). See generally Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 492 (1965). The Griswold Court struck down a statute for violating penumbras of the
Bill of Rights, especially of the Fourth Amendment, but many judges have since asserted (correctly)
that the Fourth Amendment does not support the Griswold holding. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
167-169 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) (criticizing Griswold’s penumbra rationale); Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 563 (2003) (relying upon Griswold without mentioning its penumbra
rationale). The Fourth Amendment does require much more than a valid warrant. See generally
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 180 n.1 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Moreover, the
Fourth Amendment does apply to searches without seizures, as well as to seizures without searches,
and so extends to much more than privacy. But, the Fourth Amendment does not generally extend
to punishments; otherwise, the Eighth Amendment would be inexplicably permissive. Thus, the
Fourth Amendment is inapplicable to punishing the use of contraceptives. Abortion rights can
receive some protection if the prior restraint doctrine can be invoked, so that punishment of a
culpable parent would be available after the abortion, instead of (in effect) tying a mother down
until birth. See Andrew Hyman, Abortion and Free Speech, FINDLAW’S WRIT (June 13, 2002),
available at http://www.abortionlaw.org (last visited Sept. 26, 2004) (“[t]he only way the doctrine
could work would be if subsequent penalties on abortion providers were to remain strictly limited
. . . [because] a doctor may act as, in essence, a prior restraint if he or she fears prosecution.”). The
prior restraint doctrine could be applied via the Fourth Amendment, in which case tough subsequent
abortion penalties could render prior restraints “unreasonable,” in our present societal context. The
prospect of jury nullification would not be an insurmountable obstacle to using the prior restraint
doctrine in this way. See supra note 81.
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government; as the plain language of the Clause indicates, it simply bars
states from violating the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States.90 Unfortunately, recognition of this principle was
jeopardized by a Supreme Court decision discussing this largely dormant
clause:
Writing for the majority in the Slaughter-House Cases, Justice Miller
explained that one of the privileges conferred by this [Fourteenth
Amendment Privileges or Immunities] Clause “is that a citizen of the
United States can, of his own volition, become a citizen of any State of
the Union by a bonâ fide residence therein, with the same rights as
other citizens of that State.”91

This statement of the Court in Saenz v. Roe incorrectly asserted that
Justice Miller had described a right conferred by the Privileges or
Immunities Clause. In fact, Justice Miller wrote as follows:
One of these privileges is conferred by the very article under
consideration. It is that a citizen of the United States can, of his own
volition, become a citizen of any State of the Union by a bonâ fide
residence therein, with the same rights as other citizens of that State.92

Miller used the word “article” rather than the word “clause,” and
the distinction is far from trivial. Instead of referring to the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, Justice Miller was actually referring to the
Citizenship Clause, which specifically deals with residency issues.93 If

90. One could argue that the privileges or immunities of U.S. citizens include rights
enumerated in the Constitution plus rights established statutorily by Congress, but actually Congress
has limited powers under the Fourteenth Amendment. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,
519 (1997) (congressional power is limited to remedial legislation and may not expand the restraints
imposed on states by the Fourteenth Amendment). Incidentally, although Boerne involved a
congressional attempt to expand rather than contract the federal government’s intrusion into state
governance, the Court has also held that Congress may likewise not contract the restraints that the
Fourteenth Amendment imposes upon the states. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641
(1969) (“Congress is without power to . . . authorize[] the States to violate the Equal Protection
Clause”).
91. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 503 (1999) (penultimate emphasis added). Only Justices
Rehnquist and Thomas dissented in Saenz.
92. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 80 (1872) (first emphasis added).
93. See supra note 2 (recitation of Citizenship Clause). It may be that the words of Justice
Miller have been misconstrued more than those of any other judge. See supra notes 63 and 64
(regarding Topeka). The Saenz Court did mention the Citizenship Clause, saying that it “equates
citizenship with residence.” Saenz, 526 U.S. at 506-507. More precisely, the Citizenship Clause
equates state citizenship with residence, and so the Privileges or Immunities Clause (which deals
with U.S. citizenship) was not really implicated by the facts of Saenz. It is ironic that Saenz mixed
up articles and clauses, given that the Due Process Clause is properly construed by distinguishing
“articles” from “sections.” See infra paragraph accompanying note 111.
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the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment can
confer new federally enforceable rights — rights that do not correspond
to any of the constitutional rights already restraining federal action in
Washington D.C. — then there is no limit to purported rights that can be
discovered in the Privileges or Immunities Clause. It would be tragic if
a proper interpretation of the Due Process Clause were to cause this
other Clause to be overextended. It would be frivolous for anyone to
suppose that the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States
include rights that do not restrain the federal government.
The Court in Saenz provided an extended discussion of the right to
travel, and broke that right down into at least three different components:
(1) the right of a citizen of one state to enter and leave another state, (2)
the right to be treated respectfully when temporarily present in the
second state, and (3) the right to become a permanent resident who is
treated like other citizens of the second state.94 The Saenz Court
acknowledged that the second component is completely protected by the
original Constitution.95 Regarding the first component of the right to
travel, the Saenz Court did not identify its source.96 And, as mentioned,
the third component of the right to travel is completely protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment, as the Court said in Slaughter-House.97
There is no reason to now overturn the Slaughter-House Cases,
which did not prevent application of the Bill of Rights to the states, but
rather addressed whether “the state monopoly statute violated ‘the
natural right of a person’ to do business and engage in his trade or
vocation.”98 Likewise, there is no reason for the Court to now extend the
application of the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause, because
that clause has already been correctly construed, and generally includes
both the first and second components of the right to travel described in
Saenz.99
94. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. at 500.
95. Id. at 501.
96. Id. at 500-01.
97. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 122.
98. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 77 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (internal quotations
omitted). See also Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 122.
99. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 180-181 (1868) (unanimously holding that the Article IV
Privileges and Immunities Clause ensures that visitors to a state will be entitled to rights of state
citizenship, with a right to enter and leave the state freely, but not including any further rights
without “the permission, express or implied” of the state). The Article IV Privileges and
Immunities Clause reads as follows: “The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and
immunities of citizens in the several states.” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. Paul’s interpretation in
1868 of this clause has always been followed. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 501-502 (1999). In
1866, some Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, such as Senator Jacob Howard, expected a
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Another vehicle that determined judges might like to use for
traveling to their desired results would be the Necessary and Proper
Clause.100 Justice Kennedy recently wrote for the Court in Lawrence that
some state laws “once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to
oppress.”101 If the Lawrence Court was suggesting that the Necessary
and Proper Clause is somehow applicable to state legislation, it is
difficult to imagine how that Clause could be incorporated into the
Fourteenth Amendment, inasmuch as the Necessary and Proper Clause
confers an additional power upon the federal government, rather than
limiting federal power as the Bill of Rights does. The Necessary and
Proper Clause simply adds implied powers to the express powers already
enumerated.
Likewise, incorporating the Tenth Amendment102 against the states
would not be an adequate vehicle for determined judges either.103 On its
face, the Tenth Amendment simply guarantees that the federal
government will not exercise nondelegated powers, and so incorporating
that guarantee into the Fourteenth Amendment would require the courts
to look at each state constitution in order to see what powers had or had

different and much broader interpretation by the Court as to the “nature and extent” of
unenumerated Article IV privileges and immunities, but nevertheless Howard realized that the
Court’s interpretation was unclear. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 105-107 (1947)
(Black, J., dissenting) (quoting Howard’s Senate speech of May 23, 1866). Senator Howard also
believed that, according to settled legal doctrine in 1866, the Article IV Privileges and Immunities
Clause did not affect or restrain the states, and only provided security against the United States. Id.
Thus, Howard anticipated that the Fourteenth Amendment would “probably” apply a broad range of
unenumerated rights against the states — rights which he presumed were already restraining the
federal government. Id.
100. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (Congress shall have power to “make all laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested
by the Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer
thereof.”). As Chief Justice Marshall put it, this Clause “purport[s] to enlarge, not to diminish the
powers vested in the government. It purports to be an additional power, not a restriction on those
already granted.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 420 (1819) quoted in Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898, 942 n.2 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer,
JJ.). See generally infra note 119 (further discussing the Necessary and Proper Clause).
101. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (emphasis added).
102. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
103. See generally Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE LAW
JOURNAL 1131, 1158 (1991) (there are “structural reasons that counsel caution in attempting to
incorporate the Tenth Amendment against the states”). Incidentally, in diversity cases, the Court
seems to have effectively begun applying the Tenth Amendment against the states over a century
ago. See infra note 118 (discussion of Fletcher v. Peck). Applying the Tenth Amendment to the
states would mean that, if a state supreme court determines the state government has not been
delegated a particular power, then it must be held that the state government cannot exercise that
particular power. Of course, the citizens of that state could always delegate more power.

HYMAN.DOC

2005]

12/17/2004 10:06 AM

THE LITTLE WORD “DUE”

41

not been delegated by the people to their respective state governments.104
Incorporating the Tenth Amendment into the Fourteenth could not
plausibly allow the federal courts to scour the federal Constitution for
limitations on the federal government that could then be transposed
against the states.
If the Court was to interpret the word “due” in an objectivistic way,
as the Framers intended and as the text and structure of the Constitution
compels, then doubtless some judges would urge that the Ninth
Amendment be used to achieve the same ends that have been achieved
using the Due Process Clause. However, the Ninth Amendment105 does
not create any rights that are judicially enforceable against Congress or
against the state legislatures. That Amendment is a rule of construction,
and the Court has never treated it as anything else. The Ninth
Amendment prevents courts or other government officials from using
the enumeration of rights in the first eight amendments to justify
denying or narrowly construing rights listed in other laws (e.g. in state
constitutions). The Ninth Amendment also prevents that enumeration in
the Bill of Rights from being used in order to justify an overly broad
interpretation of the powers of Congress. It is not a source of additional
enforceable rights. The Court’s sense of justice is not infallible, and that
is why the Court’s power to dispense justice was never meant to be
basically unlimited, as it would be if the Ninth Amendment was used in
the way that the Due Process Clause is now used.
As for the Eighth Amendment, one could argue that any
104. “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. X.
105. “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. IX. This is a far cry from saying that
no law shall infringe any right retained by the people. The Ninth Amendment is a rule of
construction:
[T]he Framers did not intend that the first eight amendments be construed to exhaust the
basic and fundamental rights. . . . I do not mean to imply that the Ninth Amendment is
applied against the States by the Fourteenth. Nor do I mean to state that the Ninth
Amendment constitutes an independent source of rights protected from infringement by
either the States or the Federal Government.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 490-492 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring, joined by
Warren, C.J. & Brennan, J.). “The Ninth Amendment obviously does not create federally
enforceable rights.” Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 210 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring). Applying
the Ninth Amendment against the states would be harmless, if it is recognized as simply a rule of
construction. The Court has correctly and repeatedly held that, “If granted power is found,
necessarily the objection of invasion of those rights, reserved by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments,
must fail.” United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 96 (1947). See also LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 776 n.14 (2d ed. 1988) (“It is a common error, but an
error nonetheless, to talk of ‘ninth amendment rights.’ The ninth amendment is not a source of
rights as such; it is simply a rule about how to read the Constitution.”).
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punishment whatsoever would be cruel and unusual for the “crime” of
exercising an unenumerated fundamental right. After all, the Court has
interpreted the Eighth Amendment to mean that even one minute in jail
would be cruel and unusual for some crimes106 — with the crucial caveat
that the crime must be a status crime rather than a crime involving a
behavior.107 Because of the behavioral nature of things like abortion and
sodomy, the Court has understandably circumvented the Eighth
Amendment and tried to rely on the Due Process Clause instead; the
Court in Lawrence struck down sodomy statutes that imposed “rigorous
and systematic punishment” and “consequential . . . punishment,”
notwithstanding prior holdings that the Due Process Clause affords
prisoners no greater protection than the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause.108 The Supreme Court has woven a very tangled Eighth
Amendment web in Lawrence, with misplaced reliance upon the word
“due.” The web gets more tangled by examining the record of the
congressional debates in 1789 regarding the proposed Eighth
Amendment and Bill of Rights, where no hint can be found that the
Framers viewed the Eighth Amendment (or any other amendments) as
possibly overlapping with the Due Process Clause. Be that as it may, the
Court has always refused to use the Eighth Amendment to legalize any
volitional or behavioral crimes, and the language of the Eighth
Amendment would not support such an encroachment on legislative
authority (i.e. “punishment” in the true sense of the word is a penalty for
an act or deed).
Recent decisions like the one in Lawrence may add another
constituency to those that already favor misconstruing the Due Process
Clause in a subjectivistic, results-based manner. Statutes were already
changing in a legitimate way before the Court intervened in Lawrence:
“The 25 States with laws prohibiting the relevant conduct referenced in
Bowers are reduced now to 13, of which 4 enforce their laws only
against homosexual conduct.”109 This trend strongly suggests that the
106. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
107. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 533 (1968).
108. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003). The Court had previously held that “the
Due Process Clause affords respondent no greater protection than does the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1985).
109. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003). In the opinion of the present author, the
Texas law struck down in Lawrence was unwise, but at the same time it was more unwise for the
Court to exercise power and jurisdiction that it does not constitutionally possess. Incidentally, note
that the Lawrence Court failed to distinguish between states that had legalized sodomy legislatively,
rather than by interpretation or amendment of state constitutions. There is a significant difference
between a legislative legalization as compared to a constitutional legalization. The Lawrence
decision is of the latter variety, but relies on the former as precedent (while also relying on things
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consequences of adhering to a plausible interpretation of due process
would not have the consequences some might fear. Even if those
consequences were very dire, they would still be vastly outweighed by
the need to preserve democracy and the rule of law.
A purely procedural meaning of “due process” can only be
plausibly rejected if we construe “process” as a term of art, as intended
by the First Congress.110 And, if the ordained and established intent of
the Framers is to be our guide for construing the word “process” (as it
must be if the law is to have a deliberate meaning), then overlooking that
intent becomes all the more implausible regarding the word “due.” The
intended objectivistic meaning of the Due Process Clause has not been
undermined or rendered inapplicable by any change that has occurred
since 1789, and so respecting the intended meaning of this Clause would
not mean turning back the clock to an incompatible state of affairs.
In and of itself, the Fifth Amendment did not — and does not —
secure even the most fundamental free speech and assembly rights,
much less unenumerated things like abortion and sodomy, and this is
amply confirmed by remarks of Framers like Elbridge Gerry and Roger
Sherman.111 Free speech and assembly rights are protected by the First
Amendment, and cannot be protected by judicial invocation of the Fifth
Amendment. This is as true today as it was in 1789. The Framers

like incomplete enforcement).
110. See generally supra note 7 (discussion of the Process Act passed by the First Congress).
111. Elbridge Gerry made this point during the debate over the First Amendment. See 1
ANNALS OF CONG. 760 (Joseph Gales ed. 1789) (“The people ought to be secure in the peaceable
enjoyment of this [assembly] privilege, and that can only be done by making a declaration to that
effect in the constitution.”) (emphasis added). Gerry and the First Congress rejected the notion that
the assembly right could be secured or implied by the right of free speech, much less by other rights
such as due process. See also infra note 119 (James Madison explaining that the Necessary and
Proper Clause cannot be invoked by the judiciary to protect rights that were therefore instead
protected by the Bill of Rights). Madison also believed that the Due Process Clause falls into a
different class than rights like free speech. This is why the Bill of Rights is broken up into separate
amendments. Madison wrote that rights in the Bill of Rights “will be classed according to their
affinity to each other” instead of being submitted to the states “as a single act to be adopted or
rejected in the gross.” Letter from James Madison to Alexander White (Aug. 24, 1789) in
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL
CONGRESS 287-288 (Helen E. Veit, Kenneth R. Bowling, and Charlene Bangs Bickford, eds.,
1991). In other words, the Framers plainly believed that it would be consistent for the states to
reject the Eighth Amendment, for example, but ratify the Fifth. In a recently published letter, Roger
Sherman confirmed that it was a deliberate choice by Congress that each amendment “may be
passed upon distinctly by the States, and any one that is adopted by three fourths of the legislatures
may become a part of the Constitution.” Letter from Roger Sherman to Simeon Baldwin (Aug. 22,
1789) reprinted in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 1375 (Charlene
Bickford, Kenneth R. Bowling, Helen E. Veit and William Charles DiGiacomantonio, eds., 2004)
(emphasis added).
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simultaneously submitted the Bill of Rights to each of the states for
separate ratifications in each state, instead of in a smaller number of
amendments or a single amendment (e.g. one amendment having
separate sections).
This means that the Framers foresaw no
inconsistency in the event that the states were to reject one of the
amendments but approve the rest. Therefore, when the Bill of Rights
was submitted to the states for ratification, Congress could not possibly
have viewed due process as offering the traditional protections of any of
the other amendments. The fact that the states did not actually reject any
of those Bill of Rights amendments has no bearing upon what Congress
must have intended when the amendments were submitted to the states
for ratification. It is very evident that the Due Process Clause excludes
the enumerated fundamental rights in the other amendments of the Bill
of Rights, and so it is very difficult to see how this Clause could
incorporate unenumerated rights, without concocting a very implausible
definition of the word “due.”
The word “due,” in the Constitution, was never meant to have an
impossibly vague meaning, empowering the judiciary to leave unscathed
only those taxes, those criminal prohibitions, and those civil remedies
that comport with the fundamental values of the Court. Many of the
Constitution’s terms are necessarily ambiguous, but it is improper to
attribute to the Framers a use of the word “due” that completely eclipses
the combined effect of every one of those other ambiguities. The
inevitable consequence of such an attribution is to delegate basic and
profound policy matters to judges, “for resolution on an ad hoc and
subjective basis.”112
Many scholars and jurists of all political persuasions have
expressed doubts about using the Due Process Clause to strike down
substantive statutes that are subjectivistically undue, and those doubts
are nothing new.113 In one of his last opinions, Justice Oliver Wendell
112. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972) (the Court was criticizing statutes
that are vague).
113. See, e.g., Lawrence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on FreeForm Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1297 n.247 (1995).
Professor Tribe’s article also defended the exclusivity of the treaty power. Tribe’s exclusivity
argument is supported by compelling historical evidence. See generally, Roger Sherman,
Observations on the Alterations Proposed as Amendments to the New Federal Constitution, in
ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, PUBLISHED DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY
THE PEOPLE, 1787-1788, at 235 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1892) (“It is provided by the Constitution
that no commercial treaty shall be made by the president without the consent of two-thirds of the
senators present.”). Founders such as Gilbert Livingston also realized that Congress, in contrast to
the President, would have power to make short-term treaties (a.k.a. “agreements”). As Livingston
put it, “Congress cannot make a treaty for longer than it stands.” John McKesson, Notes of the
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Holmes protested as follows:
I have not yet adequately expressed the more than anxiety that I feel at
the ever increasing scope given to the Fourteenth Amendment in
cutting down what I believe to be the constitutional rights of the States.
As the decisions now stand, I see hardly any limit but the sky to the
invalidating of those rights if they happen to strike a majority of this
Court as for any reason undesirable. I cannot believe that the
Amendment was intended to give us carte blanche to embody our
economic or moral beliefs in its prohibitions. 114

The Court nowadays denies that it is trying to “mandate our own
moral code,”115 but nevertheless the Court is exercising carte blanche
authority to delete parts of the states’ moral codes, based on the Court’s
own sense of morality, while freezing in place the morals legislation of
which the Court approves. Casting aside this subjectivistic practice
would undoubtedly have some negative effects, but those effects would
pale in comparison to the positive impact of conforming to the
constitutional plan.
The Supreme Court’s due process jurisprudence rests not upon any
fairly interpreted constitutional text, but instead owes its existence to the
doctrine of stare decisis:
Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is
more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be
settled right. . . . But in cases involving the Federal Constitution, where
correction through legislative action is practically impossible, this
Court has often overruled its earlier decisions. . . . This is strikingly
true of cases under the due process clause . . . . 116

Poughkeepsie Ratification Convention (July 25, 1788) (unpublished materials available at the New
York Historical Society). See generally supra note 16 (mentioning Livingston). See also Gilbert
Livingston, Notes of the Poughkeepsie Ratification Convention (July 25, 1788) (unpublished
manuscript available at the New York Public Library) (“Congress cannot make a treaty for a longer
time than they stand for.”). See generally Andrew Hyman, The Unconstitutionality of Long-Term
Nuclear Pacts, 23 DENVER J. INT’L LAW & POL’Y 313 (1995) (discussing time limits on
“agreements” made by Congress).
114. Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 595 (1930) (Holmes, J., dissenting, joined by
Brandeis & Stone, JJ.) (second emphasis added). See generally supra note 68 (an earlier opinion of
Brandeis and Holmes).
115. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003) (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 850 (1992)). The Court now determines what is “due” in one state by relying upon recent
policy in another state, or even recent policy in another nation if it supports the Court’s opinion.
See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573 (citing a decision of the European Court of Human Rights).
Paradoxically, the Court does not rely upon policy of the U.S. Congress to determine what state
process is “due.” See supra note 90 (congressional power is limited to enforcement).
116. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406-407, 410 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
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Many fundamental rights that have been grounded in the Due
Process Clause should be more firmly grounded in other clauses of the
Constitution, such as the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
VI. CONCLUSION
Long before the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, Chief Justice
John Marshall acknowledged that the Constitution allowed each state to
suppress free speech, to establish a religion, to make unreasonable
searches and seizures, to inflict cruel and unusual punishments, and to
take property without compensation.117 Judges today are rarely called
upon to make such disagreeable decisions as that one made by Marshall,
because a multitude of constitutional amendments now allow federal
dissenting) (second emphasis added) cited in State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997); Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-855 (1992) (declining to reconsider whether abortion is a
due process right). The Casey Court’s analysis omitted a key factor stressed by Brandeis: is it more
important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right? Is it more important
that the survival of an untold number of children and mothers be determined, or that it be
determined right? The question should answer itself. The phrase “stare decisis” is short for “stare
decisis et non quieta movere” meaning “stand by decisions and do not move that which is quiet”
(the phrase “quieta non movere” is itself a famous maxim akin to “let sleeping dogs lie”). The
Court’s abortion cases have provoked great disquiet, with over two-thirds of people saying abortion
should be illegal months before viability, despite overall support for abortion rights. See, e.g., Lydia
Saad, Roe v. Wade Has Positive Public Image, GALLUP NEWS SERVICE, January 2003; Alissa J.
Rubin, Americans Narrowing Support for Abortion, L.A. TIMES, June 18, 2000 at 1. Public opinion
is relevant at least for determining whether the Court should reconsider an issue, which is a distinct
matter from how the issue should be decided. Even if the abortion issue were quiescent,
nevertheless it is always more important to settle matters constitutionally than to perpetuate a rule
that is clearly unconstitutional. See U.S. CONST. Art. VI, cl. 3 (judges must “support this
Constitution”).
117. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 250 (1833). Barron was a takings case. The Court
decided that the Bill of Rights did not apply to the states and therefore disclaimed jurisdiction to
consider whether the taking was lawful. The Court has often shown similar restraint. See, e.g.,
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 621 (2000) (“the Fourteenth Amendment, by its very
terms, prohibits only state action” said the majority opinion of William Rehnquist, the sixteenth
Chief Justice of the U.S.); Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 575, 580 (1911) (“We fully
understand the . . . very powerful argument that can be made against the wisdom of the legislation,
but on that point we have nothing to say, as it is not our concern.”); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S.
539 (1842) (Justice Story’s opinion striking down a Pennsylvania statute that violated the Fugitive
Slave Clause). Incidentally, Justice Thomas has asserted that the First Amendment’s Free Exercise
Clause applies against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment, whereas the Establishment Clause
does not. See Elk Grove v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment). However, the location of the Establishment Clause in the First Amendment indicates
otherwise. The word “establishment” connotes a beginning rather than a continuation, and so
historical practices leading up to adoption of the Bill of Rights should be especially important in
determining how this Clause applies to both the state and federal governments. For example,
nonsectarian references to God were already an established feature of the federal government prior
to adoption of the Bill of Rights. Certainly, voluntary classroom recitation of a statement like the
first paragraph of the Declaration of Independence would not establish religion.
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judges to strike down both state and federal laws that have particular
types of flaws. But, once in a while, painful decisions have to be made.
The word “due” is not a general guarantee of rightfulness, and it cannot
be viewed that way without fundamentally amending our form of
government.
For many centuries leading up to the American Bill of Rights, no
British judge ever held that a previously enacted statute was voided by a
later statutory guarantee of “due process.”118 This historical fact has
nothing to do with the inferior role of the judiciary vis-a-vis the
legislature in Britain, and has everything to do with the then-settled
meaning of due process.
Federal courts in the United States have power to strike down many
federal laws if judges determine that Congress has abused its broad
discretion in determining what is necessary and proper,119 but that
118. See generally supra note 59 (a British judge explains the meaning of “due process”). The
words “due process” first appeared in a statute more than 650 years ago. See Statute the First, 15
Edw. 3, cl. 2 (1341) (Eng.) reprinted in 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM 295 (William S. Hein & Co.,
1993). According to that statute, Parliament allocated to itself authority for conducting certain
trials, but in other cases the statute made an exception if “the laws [are] rightfully used, and by due
process.” Id. Thus, due process did not guarantee rightfulness then, and it does not guarantee
rightfulness now. As everyone knows, “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). However, just as
importantly, it is “the peculiar province of the legislature to prescribe general rules for the
government of society . . .” Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 136 (1810). Chief Justice Marshall
suggested in Fletcher that the Court could reject some of the powers purportedly delegated to a state
legislature, but only if there had been “an intention to except.” Id. at 139. In other words, judges
cannot reject a legislature’s power if the people who approved the constitution meant to vest that
power in the legislature. The Marshall Court later revisited Fletcher, reiterating that the U.S.
Constitution did not carve out an unwritten exception to the legislative power exercised by Georgia
in the Fletcher case, but rather the people who adopted the Georgia constitution may have intended
such an exception. See Satterlee v. Matthewson, 27 U.S. 380, 413-414 (1829). The relationship of
Fletcher to Satterlee is similar to the relationship of Topeka to Davidson. See supra note 63.
Fletcher and Topeka were both diversity cases; Satterlee and Davidson both emphasized that the
state supreme court had not spoken in Fletcher and Topeka respectively.
119. See THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 233 (James Madison) (William Brock ed., 1992) (the
success or failure of violations of the Necessary and Proper Clause “will depend on the executive
and judiciary departments, which are to expound and give effect to the legislative acts; and in the
last resort a remedy must be obtained from the people, who can, by the election of more faithful
representatives, annul the acts of the usurpers”). Nevertheless, the Framers did not believe the
judiciary could take hold of the Necessary and Proper Clause so as to prevent Congress from
violating free speech and other rights: “Now, may not laws be considered necessary and proper by
Congress, for it is them who are to judge of the necessity and propriety to accomplish those special
purposes which they may have in contemplation, which laws in themselves are neither necessary or
proper?” 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 455-56 (Joseph Gales ed. 1789) (speech of James Madison
introducing Bill of Rights). The courts have likewise recognized that the Necessary and Proper
Clause affords considerable discretion to Congress. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421
(1819) (“[W]e think the sound construction of the constitution must allow to the national legislature
that discretion, with respect to the means by which the powers it confers are to be carried into
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sweeping power does not apply to statutes enacted pursuant to the
express powers of Congress, much less to state statutes. The Necessary
and Proper Clause has never been applied against the states.
Judges also have power to mitigate and confine unjust and partial
laws, by trying to construe laws in a way that comports with justice. In
this way, passage of bad legislation can often be prevented, by the
necessity of phrasing the bad legislation very clearly. But, if such
legislation is written clearly and passed, then it generally must be
honored by the courts.
The Court has unanimously acknowledged the following about its
subjectivistic due process jurisprudence:
[W]e must always bear in mind that the substantive content of the [Due
Process] Clause is suggested neither by its language nor by
preconstitutional history; that content is nothing more than the
accumulated product of judicial interpretation of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.120

This seems to be an admission by the Court that it has taken
jurisdiction — without having been given it — to censor legislation of
the states affecting fundamental unenumerated rights. Chief Justice
Marshall did not mince words about judges who extend their own
authority: “We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction
which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the
other would be treason to the constitution.”121 The Court’s due process
jurisprudence needs a fresh and thorough reexamination, for conformity
with the Constitution.
Oliver Ellsworth, who was a delegate to the constitutional
convention, and a U.S. Senator when the Bill of Rights was proposed to
the states for ratification (and who would later become the third Chief
Justice of the U.S.) had some pertinent comments about this subject:
“Liberty is a word which, according as it is used, comprehends the most
good and the most evil of any in the world.”122 This is why the clause in
question confers no protection for liberty except where “due process of
law” is absent.
execution, which will enable that body to perform the high duties assigned to it, in the manner most
beneficial to the people.”). See generally supra note 100.
120. University of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225-226 (1985) (citation omitted).
121. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 404 (1821). See generally supra note 118 (discussing
Marshall’s opinion in Fletcher).
122. Oliver Ellsworth, A Landholder III, in ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES, PUBLISHED DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE, 1787-1788, at 146 (Paul Leicester
Ford ed., 1892).
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The Due Process Clause was not intended to be a one-way street to
ever-greater personal liberty, and that interpretation is not dissimilar to
the doctrine of laissez faire economics, which likewise had no basis in
the Constitution. People may have a fundamental natural right to
demand respect for certain conduct, but that does not make the conduct a
legally enforceable due process right. By the same token, legislators
may have a moral duty to abide by fundamental principles of distributive
justice, such as suum cuique (“to each his own”), but that does not entitle
the judiciary to arrest the legislative will when that principle appears to
be in jeopardy.
One could argue that the word “due” should be construed as a
subjectivistic requirement of fairness, rightfulness, and propriety, while
the word “process” should be construed as addressing procedure rather
than substance.123 But we must keep in mind that other provisions of the
Bill of Rights can compensate for much of the procedural protection that
has been improperly inferred from the Due Process Clause.124
The reasoning in Lawrence is very much of the same doctrinal
variety as in Dred Scott and Lochner,125 even though — viewed as
judicial legislation — the reasoning in Lawrence is far more reasonable
and compassionate than that of either Dred Scott or Lochner.
Unfortunately, the Lawrence opinion reiterated carte blanche authority
to insert the Supreme Court’s sense of fairness into the prohibitions of
the Due Process Clause. This alleged judicial power would have
alarmed the New York Antifederalists who proposed the Due Process
Clause for inclusion in the federal Constitution, and who were very wary
of the judiciary:
[A prisoner may] hold his life . . . at the pleasure of the Supreme Court,
to which an appeal lies, and consequently depend on the tender
mercies, perhaps, of the wicked, (for judges may be wicked;) and what
those tender mercies are, I need not tell you. You may read them in
the history of the Star Chamber . . . .126

123. See supra note 7 (view of Justice Scalia).
124. See supra note 89.
125. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
126. Thomas Tredwell, 2 JONATHAN ELLIOTT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL CONVENTIONS ON
THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 400 (1836) (1788) (statement in New York
ratifying convention). The issues that the Court deals with nowadays are just as controversial as any
dealt with by the Star Chamber:
The baby’s little fingers were clasping and unclasping, and his little feet were kicking.
Then the doctor stuck the scissors in the back of his head, and the baby’s arms jerked
out, like a startle reaction, like a flinch, like a baby does when he thinks he is going to
fall. The doctor opened up the scissors, stuck a high-powered suction tube into the
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That wariness led the New York Antifederalists to write a Due
Process Clause in which the word “due” does not give the Court carte
blanche power. The Court’s power is instead supposed to be limited by
positive law.
Ulysses S. Grant once said that, “I know no method to secure the
repeal of bad or obnoxious laws so effective as their stringent
execution.”127 If the Constitution is imperfect, the courts ought to
trumpet that imperfection, and then executive officers will enforce it,
and the people will be able to fix it by amendment. George Washington
warned that circumventing the amendment procedure “in one instance
may be the instrument of good, [but] it is the customary weapon by
which free governments are destroyed.”128 In Lawrence v. Texas,
misconstruing the Due Process Clause may be the instrument of good in
a narrow sense, but not in the wider sense. Admittedly, there is more
than a little truth in the old saying that no one’s life, liberty or property
are safe while the legislature is in session, but the solution is to elect
better legislatures and write better constitutional amendments, rather
than bestow legislative power upon unaccountable judges.
The word “due” basically means “owed.”129 The federal Due
Process Clause simply requires that whatever legal process is owed must
be provided, and the government cannot merely provide some of that
process. Unfortunately, the current prevailing judicial doctrine is that a
plaintiff may be owed a process according to positive law, but must
opening, and sucked the baby’s brains out. Now the baby went completely limp.
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 1007 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting a nurse) (citations
omitted). Other methods for aborting a fetus, even after the embryonic stage which lasts two
months from conception, have also been protected by the Court using the Due Process Clause, “in
the event that contraception should fail.” See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856
(1992).
127. Ulysses S. Grant, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1869), reprinted in INAUGURAL
ADDRESSES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, H. DOC. NO. 93-208 at 129 (1974).
128. George Washington, Farewell Address, reprinted in 1 COMPILATION OF MESSAGES AND
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 212 (J.D. Richardson ed., 1907) (1796). If the Due Process Clause
were properly enforced, that could well galvanize support for constitutional amendments that
achieve what determined judges have sought to achieve from the bench.
129. The word “due” comes from the French word for “owed.” See supra note 4 (Samuel
Johnson’s dictionary).
The whole difficulty arises from the different senses in which the term ‘due’ is used. It
is sometimes used to express the mere state of indebtment, and then is an equivalent to
owed, or owing. And it is sometimes used to [additionally] express the fact that the debt
has become payable.
United States v. State Bank of North Carolina, 31 U.S. 29, 36 (1832). See generally 30A WORDS
AND PHRASES, PERMANENT EDITION, 1658 TO DATE 377-378, 381-389 (1972) (“due” is
synonymous with “owed”). The word “due” is to be distinguished from the word “just” used in the
Takings Clause. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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succumb to a contrary process owed to a defendant according to
principles of natural justice. Such a doctrine cannot be legitimately
squeezed or discerned from the Due Process Clause.
When the Framers made the judiciary a separate branch of
government, they did not intend to elevate judge-made rules to a level of
equality with positive law, much less to a superior position, and yet that
is how the Due Process Clause is now being interpreted with respect to
the most fundamental and important issues in American society and
family life. By gradually replacing the meaning of the Due Process
Clause, the judiciary is exercising judicial review of the Constitution
itself, for conformity with the judiciary’s own subjectivistic concept of
inalienable rights and liberties.
The U.S. Constitution reflects the will of the people, as that will is
expressed in the words of the document itself, and those words are
meant to withstand the changing temper of the judiciary. The great
principle of liberty — in both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments —
is inextricably connected to the principle of due process, and no court
has authority to sever that connection. A wise New Yorker, and primary
sponsor of the Due Process Clause, warned against such encroachments
upon political liberty:
[T]he people should make the laws by which they were to be governed.
He who is controlled by another is a slave; and that government which
is directed by the will of any one, or a few, or any number less than is
the will of the community, is a government for slaves.130

The Due Process Clause requires that judicial proceedings unfold
according to the law, rather than according to the judiciary’s contrary
opinions.

130. Melancton Smith, 2 JONATHAN ELLIOTT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL CONVENTIONS ON
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 227 (1836) (1788) (speech during New York
ratification convention about representation in Congress). Smith was the leading Antifederalist in
the New York ratification convention that proposed the Due Process Clause. Most scholars now
believe that he was also the “Federal Farmer,” who led the Antifederalists in the press. See JACK N.
RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 22829 (Alfred A. Knopf 1996). The New York ratification debates and ratification convention are
central to the legislative history of the Due Process Clause. When Congress submitted the Bill of
Rights to the states for ratification, Congress affixed a preamble, stating as follows: “The
conventions of a number of the States, having at the time of their adopting the Constitution,
expressed a desire, in order to prevent misconstruction or abuse of its powers, that further
declaratory and restrictive clauses should be added. . . .” 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra
note 13, at 40. New York was the only state that had expressed a desire for the “due process”
language.
THE

